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Ravazzini: Amalgamating Reorganizations

COMMENT

THE AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATION
PROVISIONS: THE ASYMMETRY IN
TREATMENT OF FORWARD AND REVERSE
TRIANGULAR MERGERS AND OTHER
PROBLEMS
There is something wrong with provisions which
remain so obscure, in spite of filigree detail in
the statute and the regulations, that hardly any
prediction as to their meaning can be made
without the feeling that it is little better than a
dignified guess. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation is a separate entity which is required to file
returns and pay income taxes in a way similar to that required
of individual taxpayers.2 The gross income of both corporations
and individuals is determined under Internal Revenue Code
(hereinafter "the Code") Section 61.3 However, choosing to do
business in the corporate form carries with it the disadvantage
of incurring double taxation of distributed earnings. 4 More
specifically, a corporation must pay taxes not only on its own
net income, but its shareholders must also pay tax on the distribution of the corporation's after-tax earnings. 5
1. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, Third Series 164
(1940).
2. See CEB, TAX PLANNING FOR S CORPORATIONS UNDER THE NEW RULES,
program handbook at 8-9, January 1991.
3. I.R.C. § 61.
4. CEB, supra note 2, at 1.
5. Id. at 8-9.
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One of the fundamental principles of tax law is that unrealized appreciation in the value of property should be taxed
only when the property is sold or otherwise transferred. 6 If
there is an exchange of property for money or other property, a
taxable event occurs if the property received materially diflfers
from the property transferred. 7 Recognizing that mere changes
in the form of corporate holdings should not trigger the recognition of unrealized gain, Congress enacted a statute in 1918
which makes an exchange of stock or securities for other stock
or securities tax-free if made in connection with a "reorganization, merger or consolidation."8
Today, special rules may apply when a corporation sells its
assets, or when its shareholders exchange their stock for the
stock of another corporation. Provided certain requirements
are satisfied, the transaction can be accomplished tax-free to
all the involved parties. 9 Following the transaction, a selling
shareholder's investment continues to be represented by shares
of stock; however, such shares constitute interest in a different
corporation. 1O Thus, a reorganization may provide the opportunity for a shareholder to change the substance of an investment in a tax-free manner.ll
Unfortunately, the complex and varied reorganization
definitions have proven to be a formidable barrier to achieving
tax equipoise within the Code. The current reorganization
principles vary from provision to provision, seemingly without
rhyme or reason. 12 No sound tax policy justifies the disparate

6. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1960).
8. Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919). Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) Portfolios, Corporate Acquisitions - (A), (B) and (C) Reorganizations, No.
771 at A-47 (1994).
9. [d. The Code provides generally for nonrecognition of gain or loss at both
the shareholder level (§§ 354 and 356) and the corporate level (§ 361); any unrecognized gain or loss is reflected in the substituted basis of qualifying property
received by the shareholder (§ 362), and is preserved for recognition in a subsequent taxable disposition. P. WEIDENBRUCH, JR. AND K BURKE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND STOCKHOLDERS, at 195 (3rd ed., 1989).
10. CEB, supra note 2, at 90.
11. [d.
12. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION, at 233 (3rd
ed., 1995). See infra Section III entitled "DISCUSSION: THE LACK OF A UNIFYING
PRINCIPLE IN THE CURRENT AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATION DEFINITIONS" for ex-
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treatment of economically equivalent or near-equivalent corporate acquisition transactions. 13 While tax planning for reorganizations has certainly become a more predictable endeavor
in the past decade due to the plethora of illustrative Regulations and Letter Rulings,14 a need for further clarification and
unification of the Code remains. 15
This comment will discuss the amalgamating reorganizations generally (types A through C as well as some D'S)16 and,
specifically, triangular reorganizations. 17 This comment will
first provide an overview of the general requirements of the
amalgamating reorganization provisions. It will then continue
to the following topics: (1) a discussion of the Code's triangular
reorganization provisions, giving attention to both forward and
reverse triangular mergers;1S (2) an analysis of the asymmetry in treatment of triangular mergers based on whether they
take the form of a forward or reverse triangular merger; (3) an

amples.
13. See id. at 233-234.
14. The tenn "letter ruling" is most commonly associated with the Internal
Revenue Service and the Tax Code; in that context, a "letter ruling is "a written
statement issued to a taxpayer or his authorized representative by the National
Office which interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts." 26
C.F.R. Section 601.201(a)(2) (1995). Although a letter ruling may be revoked or
modified unless it is accompanied by a "closing agreement," see Rev. Proc. 95·1,
Section 1.01, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 13, any "revocation or modification of a ruling will
not be applied retroactively with respect to the taxpayer to whom the ruling was
originally issued." 26 C.F.R. Section 601.201(1)(5) (1995). A ruling will not be applied retroactively against the taxpayer to whom the ruling was originally issued
so long as: (i) there has been no misstatement or omission of material facts, (ii)
the facts subsequently developed are not materially different from the facts on
which the ruling was based, (iii) there has been no change in the applicable law,
(iv) the ruling was issued with respect to a prospective or proposed transaction,
and (v) the taxpayer directly involved in the ruling acted in good faith in reliance
upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation would be to his detriment." [d.
15. See ABRAMS AND OOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 233-234.
16. See infra notes 76-163 and accompanying text for a detialed discussion of
the amalgamating reorganizations.
17. "Triangular reorganizations" involve the use of a subsidiary to acquire the
desired target corporation.
18. A "forward" triangular merger entails a subsidiary corporation acquiring
the target corporation in a statutory merger using the parent corporation's stock
as consideration. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(O). A "reverse" triangular merger occurs
when the parent corporation's controlled subsidiary merges into the target corporation; the acquired corporation survives, and its shareholders exchange controlling
stock of the acquired corporation for voting stock of the acquiring parent corporation. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E).
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exploration of the Congressional desire for tax-parity among
the reorganization provisions and an assessment of whether
the Service has been complying with legislative intent; and (4)
a conclusion that, while the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter "the Service") has made some positive changes towards
the goals of clarification and unification of the Code, tax planners should continue to expect the unexpected.
II. BACKGROUND

A complex assortment of statutory provisions within the
Code controls the federal income tax treatment of corporate
reorganizations. The term "reorganization"19 is strictly limited
to those transactions described in Section 368(a)(1) of the
Code. 20 Section 368 is a definitional section only; nowhere in
Section 368 are the tax implications of a reorganization mentioned. 21 However, Section 368 is important because many
other sections are triggered by transactions meeting the definitions contained in Section 368. 22

19. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(I) of the Code defines the term "reorganization" to
include mergers, consolidations, recapitalizations, acquisitions by one corporation of
the stock or assets of another corporation, and changes in form or place of organization.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(a). See generally BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, (6th ed., 1994).
21. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 209.
22. [d. The reorganization and division provisions are contained in Subparts B,
C, and D of Part III ("Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations") of Subchapter C. These are labeled "Effects on shareholders and security holders," "Effects on
corporations," and "Special rule; definitions." The Code sections are summarized
here briefly:
Subpart B
Sections 354 and 355: nonrecognition at the
shareholder and security holder level on receipt of qualifying consideration.
Section 356: extent to which gain is recognized
on receipt of additional consideration (boot).
Section 357: assumption of liabilities.
Section 358: shareholder and security holder
substituted basis.
Subpart C
Section 361: nonrecognition exchanges at corporate level.
Section 362: corporate basis carryover.
SUbpart D
Section 368: definitions of exchanges classified
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Section 368 divides reorganizations into four broad groups:
(1) amalgamating reorganizations in which two or more corporations are combined into a single corporate structure; (2)
divisive reorganizations in which a single corporation is divided into two or more companies; (3) single-party reorganizations
in which one corporation undergoes a substantial change in
financial structure, modifies its place of incorporation, or another similar corporate characteristic; and (4) bankruptcy reorganizations in which a financially distressed corporation seeks
to improve its position. 23 This comment focuses on the amalgamating reorganizations.
A.

AMALGAMATING
REQUIREMENTS

REORGANIZATIONS:

GENERAL

To qualify for tax-free treatment, a transaction must first
meet one of the definitions of a "reorganization." The term "reorganization" is strictly limited to the specific transactions set
forth in Section 368(a).24 Tax-free treatment of reorganiza-

as reorganizations.
In addition to these sections the following play an integral role in corporate reorganizations and divisions:
Section 1032: nonrecognition for corporation on
issuance of its own stock.
Section 311: nonrecognition for corporation on distribution of its stock in a division.
Sections 108, 269, 381, 382, and 383: survival and
carryover of corporate tax attributes.
Also, a brief survey of the Code sections should not ignore the requirements that
have been imposed by the Treasury Department and by the courts. ROSE AND
CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, at 580, (3rd ed., 1988).
It should be noted that as a result of a reorganization, the acquiring corporation succeeds to a variety of tax attributes of the acquired corporation (See §
381(a)(2) - this rule does not extend to a B reorganization, since the acquired
corporation in that case remains in existence). Inchided among the various attributes that carry over to the acquiring corporation are the acquired corporation's
earnings and profits, net operating loss carryovers, methods of computing depreciation, and method of accounting (See generally I.R.C. § 381(c)). CEB, supra note 2,
at 101-102.
23. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 209. In terms of I.R.C. § 368,
the amalgamating reorganizations consist of types A through C as well as some
D's; the divisive reorganizations include the remainder of the D's as well as transactions described in § 355 though not falling within the definitions of I.R.C. §
368(a)(I); the single party reorganizations are the types E and F; and the bankruptcy reorganization is the G. [d.
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2. CEB, supra note 2, at 91.
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tions is premised upon the notion of "continuity of investment;"
investors are viewed as preserving their interest in a business
enterprise through continuing stock ownership, notwithstanding the change in corporate form. 25 To protect this notion,
courts have developed a variety of doctrines to ensure that
transactions literally meeting the statutory definitions are
genuinely entitled to nonrecognition treatment. 26 Included
among these doctrines are (1) continuity of proprietary interest, (2) continuity of business enterprise, (3) business purpose,
and (4) step transaction. 27
1. Continuity of Proprietary Interest Doctrine
The one unifying aspect of statutory reorganizations is
that of "continuity of interest. ,,28 The continuity of proprietary
interest doctrine requires that the shareholders of the acquired
corporation have received stock representing a substantial
proprietary stake in the acquiring corporation. 29 The purpose
of this doctrine is to deny nonrecognition when the shareholders have in substance "cashed out" their investment. 30 Thus,
early reorganization cases frequently hinged upon the issue of
whether there was, in substance, a sale, or whether the share-

25. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b); See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gilmore's Estate, 130
F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1942). The rationale for tax-free treatment of such organizations
is the same as that for § 351 incorporations: not enough is changed by the transaction to warrant immediate imposition of tax. See BITI'KER AND EUSTICE, infra
note 26, at 12-10, 12-11. The litigation in this area has often involved whether the
lines drawn in § 368 properly distinguish mere changes in form not warranting
taxation and other rearrangements that are fully taxable. See id.
26. See BORIS I. BITI'KER AND JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, at 12-24, 12-25 (6th ed., 1994).
27. [d.
2B. For recent cases involving the continuity of proprietary interest doctrine,
see, e.g., Seagram Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. No.4, 95 TNT 16-11 (1995)
(rejecting the argument that a pre-acquisition cash purchase of target shares by a
corporation unrelated to the acquiring corporation would destroy continuity of interest in an otherwise valid reorganization); Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner,
104 T.C. No.5 (1995); Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir.
1994).
29. See, e.g., Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1932) (transfer of assets for cash and short-term notes constituted a sale, not a
reorganization); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1960).
30. CEB, supra note 2, at 91. Note, this doctrine is embodied in the statutory
definitions of Band C reorganizations which require the use of voting stock consideration. Sections 36B(a)(1)(B) and (C).
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holders maintained a continuity of interest in the post-acquisition corporation. 31
In Helvering v. Minnesota Tea CO.,32 the Supreme Court
upheld the tax-free status of a transfer of corporate assets in
exchange for what amounted to $540,000 in stock and
$425,000 in cash. 33 Although the stock interest received by
the shareholders of the transferor corporation left them with a
minority interest in the ongoing venture,34 the Court concluded that the need for a continuing proprietary interest was
satisfied because a "material part" of the consideration was an
equity interest in the transferee. 35 For ruling purposes, the
Service has indicated that the continuity of interest requirement will be satisfied if there is stock ownership on the part of
the former shareholders equal in value to at least 50% of all
the formerly outstanding stock of the acquired corporation. 36
Moreover, if a sufficient percentage of stock is received, it does
not matter that each shareholder receives a different percentage of stock and other consideration. 37
A more recent development regarding continuity of interest was announced in Paulsen v. Commissioner.38 In Paulsen,
the Supreme Court held that continuity of interest was lacking
in a merger of two savings and loan associations39 where
shareholders of the acquired corporation gave up their guaranty stock in exchange for passbook accounts and certificates of
31. See, e.g., Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940) (holding that a transfer
of corporate assets in exchange for cash plus bonds payable over 11 years failed to
be a tax-free reorganization); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage v. Commissioner, 287
U.S. 462 (1933) (holding that a transfer of corporate assets in exchange for cash
plus well-secured promissory notes payable in less than four months could not
qualify as a reorganization).
32. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
33. Id. at 386.
34. Their equity interest represented about 7.5% of the transferee's outstanding
stock. See id. at 381-382.
35. Id. at 386. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 211.
36. Id. See Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114; Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B.
568. But See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (holding that a
rearrangement was a reorganization even though it resulted in less than 50%
continuity of interest).
37. See Rev. Rul. 66·224, 1966-2 C.B. 114.
38. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985).
39. One authorized to issue "guaranty stock" to its owners and the other having no stock of any kind. Id. at 133
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deposit in the surviving corporation. 40 The result was reasonable since the consideration could be viewed as a cash
equivalent without significant equity features. 41 However, the
taxpayers had argued that the continuity of interest test
should focus on the nature of the consideration received rather
than the relative change in proprietary interest.42 If this is
the appropriate test, it is difficult to distinguish the Paulsen
situation from a merger of two non-stock savings and loan
associations, which has been held to constitute a tax-free reorganization.43 Although, the Supreme Court addressed this
point in its Paulsen opinion, the Court was sufficiently unclear
as to leave some uncertainty concerning the appropriate standard."
2. Continuity of Business Enterprise and Business Purpose
Doctrines

A reorganization requires the business enterprise of the
acquired corporation to continue under the modified corporate
form.45 Therefore, when a corporation reorganizes, but its core
business continues to operate, only the corporate form has
changed, and no taxable transaction has occurred.46 The "continuity of business enterprise" requirement is met if the acquiring corporation either continues the transferor's historic
business or continues to use a "significant portion" of the
transferor's historic business assets in a different business. 47

40. ld. at 134-135.
41. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 212-213.
42. See Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 141.
43. See Rev. Rul. 69-3, 1969-1 C.B. 103. P. WEIDENBRUCH, JR. AND K BURKE,
supra note 9, at 19B.
44. See Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 142; see also ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra
note 12, at 213. The Paulsen Court gave a brief explanation involving a comparison of the equity interests received and those given up in the exchange. See
Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 142. However, the Court's explanation did not address the
taxpayers' argument - that the continuity of interest test turns on the nature of
the consideration received and not on the relative change in proprietary-equity
interest. See id.
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(b) (1960); See also Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
46. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 214.
47. ld. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(d) (1960). The phrase "significant portion of
[target's] historic business assets" is partially explained in Treasury Regulation §
1.36B-1(d)(4)(iii): "In general, the determination of the portion of a corporation's
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Distinct from the continuity of business enterprise doctrine
is the business purpose doctrine. The business purpose doctrine does not recognize transactions that serve only the purpose of avoiding taxes. 4B Under the Regulations, the doctrine
requires that the transactions ''be undertaken for reasons germane to the continuance of the business of a corporation."49

3. Step Transaction Doctrine
The step transaction doctrine is an extension of the tax
principle that a transaction's substance, but not its form, determines tax consequences. 50 Attention is paid to the overall result of a series of interdependent transactions; the results of
each transaction are not viewed in isolation. 51 A roundabout
approach taken by a taxpayer to achieve a technically legitimate result is ignored where the only purpose for the detour is
tax avoidance. 52 The courts have long held the view that "[a]
given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path.,,53
Unfortunately, the circumstances in which the step transaction doctrine is properly applicable have by no means been
consistently delineated by the Service or the courts. 54 Moreover, even when there is agreement that a particular case

assets considered 'significant' is based on the relative importance of the assets to
operation of the business. However, all other facts and circumstances, such as the
net fair market value of those assets, will be considered." [d. See Laure v. Commissioner, 653 F.2d 253 (1981).
48. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (1960). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) and (c)
(1960).
50. See BITrKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-208, 12-209.
51. See Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156 (incorporation of several subsidiaries
under Section 351, a merger of an unrelated corporation into one of the subsidiaries in a forward triangular merger, and a reincorporation of the parent under
Section 368(aXIXF) were respected as separate steps where each transaction "is
sufficiently meaningful on its own account, and is not dependent upon the other
transaction for its substantiation.").
52. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-209.
53. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938); See generally
Mintz and Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. TAX
INST. 247 (1954).
54. Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Portfolios, Corporate Acquisitions - (A), (B) and (C)
Reorganizations, No. 771 at A-63 (1994).
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warrants a step transaction analysis, no universally accepted
set of legal standards exists for applying the doctrine. 55
Courts have applied three alternative tests in determining
whether to invoke the step transaction doctrine in a particular
transaction: the "end result" test,56 the "mutual interdependence" test,57 and the "binding commitment,,58 test. 59 Based
on the Tax Court cases in the post-transaction continuity area60 and the Service's stance on this issue,61 the mutual interdependence test is most commonly applied. 62
Step transaction issues may overlap with continuity of
interest issues in a variety of ways. For example, an interesting step transaction problem involves whether planned postmerger sales of the surviving corporation stock by former

55. Id.
56. Under this, the most liberal test, the step transaction doctrine will be invoked if it appears that a series of formally separate steps are in fact prearranged
parts of a single transaction intended from the beginning to arrive at the ultimate
result. Id. at A-64. See Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987); See
also Christian Est. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. 1231, 1239 (1989). The end result
test is based upon the actual intent of the taxpayers, although the results desired
by the parties are often difficult to ascertain. See id.
57. The mutual interdependence test focuses on whether "the steps are so
interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been
fruitless without a completion of the series." Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d
1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 913. See also Kass v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 218 (1973), affd without published opinion, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir.
1974); Farr v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 350 (1955); American Wire Fabrics Corp. v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 607 (1951); American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11
T.C. 397 (1948), affd 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949). BNA, No. 771, supra note 54,
at A-64 and n. 770.
58. The narrowest alternative for applying the step transaction doctrine, the
binding commitment test forbids use of the doctrine unless, at the time the first
step is commenced, there is a binding agreement to take a later step. BNA, No.
771, supra note 54, at A-64. See Redding, 630 F.2d at 1178; Commissioner v.
Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). The binding commitment test is generally designed for the characterization of steps which span several tax years and are "not
only indeterminable but unfixed for an indefinite and unlimited period in the future, awaiting events that might or might not happen." McDonald's Restaurants of
11. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1982), citing Commissioner v.
Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-64.
59. Id. at A-63.
60. See, e.g., Christian Est., 57 T.C.M at 1231; Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1415.
61. See Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156 <substance of each of a series of
independent steps will be recognized, and step transaction doctrine not applied if
step has independent economic significance, is not a sham, and was undertaken
for a valid business purpose).
62. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-63.
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transferor corporation shareholders cause the transaction to
lose its reorganization status. 63 Corporate tax professors
Howard E. Abrams and Richard L. Doernberg considered both
sides of this issue:
If so,

such sales will affect the other
shareholders who choose to continue to hold
their investment in the surviving corporation as
well the acquiring corporation whose basis varies depending on whether the transaction qualifies as a reorganization. If not, then the empty
formalism of issuing registered shares in a
merger involving a publicly-held corporation will
eviscerate the continuity of proprietary interest
doctrine. 54

Therefore, absent a binding commitment to dispose of the
shares, even a prompt post-merger disposition should not
break. continuity,65 so long as the former transferor corporation shareholders are "at risk" with respect to the acquiring
corporation's shares and have the option to retain such
shares. 66
However, it is possible that a court may accept a broader
interpretation of the step transaction doctrine, as did the Seventh Circuit in the controversial of McDonald's Restaurants of
Illinois v. Commissioner. 67 In McDonald's, companies of a
franchise group were merged into McDonald's Corporation. 68
Seven months later, the former shareholders of the acquired
companies sold the McDonald's stock they had received in the
merger. 69 The taxpayers, subsidiaries of McDonald's to which

63. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 213-214.
64. [d. at 214. Howard E. Abrams and Richard L. Doernberg are professors at
Emory University.
65. Herbert N. Beller, Final Regulations Ease Planning for Tax-Free Reverse
Subsidiary Mergers, 64 J.TAX'N 80 (Feb. 1986). If post-merger sales have an adverse effect on the non-selling shareholders, then the tax implications of a corporate rearrangement cannot be determined with certainty until well after the transaction. In addition, it may be impossible to determine which shareholders sell
their shares and when they do so.
66. [d.
67. McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 520. See generally P. Faber, The Use and Misuse
of the Plan of Reorganization Concept, 38 TAX L. REV. 515 (1983).
68. [d. at 522.
69. [d.
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the assets of the franchise companies had been transferred
after the merger, argued that the step transaction doctrine
should apply to disqualify the transaction as a tax-free reorganization. 70 The taxpayers claimed that McDonald's merger,
followed by a sale of stock, violated the continuity of interest
requirement. 71 Therefore, contended that the assets should
hold a sterred-up basis rather than a carry-over basis.72
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the taxpayers and held
that the step transaction doctrine was applicable because ultimate sale of the stock received by the former shareholders of
the acquired companies was an integral part of the transaction. 73 Thus, McDonald's shows that no definitive judicial application of the step transaction doctrine exists74 and that the
tax fate of certain transactions may turn on a particular
court's unique interpretation of the doctrine on a case-by-case
basis.75
B. REQllREMENTS OF "A" THROUGH "D" AMALGAMATING
REORGANIZATIONS

Under Section 368, tax-free amalgamating reorganizations
are designated by four subtypes: A, B, C or D.76 Generally
speaking, these reorganizations are different methods of combining two or more corporations by tax-free means. 77 A typical
"A" reorganization involves one corporation acquiring the assets of another corporation, in exchange for stock of the acquir-

70. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 522-524.
71. See id. at 524; see also ROSE AND CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, at
596 (3rd ed., 1988).
72. See McDonald's, 688 F.2d at 522.
73. See id. at 524. In Robert A Penrod, 88 T.C. 1415, 1437 (1987), the Tax
Court held that the exchange of stock of corporations that operated fast-food restaurants under McDonald's franchises for stock of McDonald's Corporation qualified
as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A) even though the taxpayers sold the
McDonald's stock eight months after acquiring it due to events that occurred after
the stock was acquired. Hence, the acquisition of the stock and its subsequent sale
were not transactions that should be stepped together. [d.
74. See generally BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-63, A-64.
75. See id.
76. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 209.
77. See id.
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ing corporation plus additional consideration. 78 The Code defines a "B" reorganization as the acquisition of stock of one
corporation in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquiring
corporation or its parent. 79 In a "C" reorganization, one corporation acquires "substantially all" of the assets of another corporation in exchange for voting stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent. 80 Finally, a non-divisive "D" reorganization
requires that one corporation transfer all or part of its assets
to another "controlled" corporation, and that the transferor
then distribute stock or securities of the controlled corporation. 81 While in many instances the choice of one or another
may be simply a matter of convenience, there are qualifying
differences that may dictate the most advantageous technique
for a given situation. 82 Moreover, tax considerations may not
be the over-riding factors when structuring these transactions. 83
1. "A" Reorganizations

An "A" reorganization is defined as a statutory merger or
consolidation. 84 Every state statutorily provides for mergers
and consolidations. 85 A statutory merger is the most flexible
78. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
79. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B).
80. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C).
81. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(0).
82. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26; at 12-21, 12-22 and 12-42; see
also ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 233. For example, permissible
consideration in A reorganizations and in forward triangular mergers is limited
only by common law, whereas the only allowable consideration in B reorganizations and reverse triangular mergers (at least 80%) is voting stock. Id. In between
these opposites lies the C reorganizations, which allow up to 20% boot. Id.
83. Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Portfolios, Structuring Corporate Acquisitions - Tax As·
peets, No. 770 at A-144 (1993).
84. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(A). "Statutory" for this purpose refers to applicable
state law. In a merger, one corporation absorbs the corporate enterprise of another
corporation. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-41. Consolidations involve
the combination of two or more corporations into a newly created entity. Id. Merg.
ers are much more common than consolidations, since it is generally desirable for
one of the combining corporations to survive the transaction, particularly where
one of the corporations owns assets with restriction, or assignment. BNA, No. 771,
supra note 54, at A-6. The creation of a new corporation in a consolidation may
add to the necessity or expense of qualifying to do business or exchanging shares
of the surviving corporation. Id. A consolidation is most useful where the combining corporations desire a new state of incorporation. Id.
85. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, §
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form of the tax-free reorganizations86 but generally requires
shareholder approva1. 87 Mer approval, the assets and liabilities of the acquired corporation pass to the acquiring corporation by operation of law and the acquired corporation disappears as a separate legal entity. 88
The Code does not specifically prescribe the consideration
that can be paid by the acquiring corporation in a merger, as it
does in a B or C reorganization. 89 Voting stock, nonvoting
stock, debt securities, cash, or other property may be used
without disqualifying the transaction as a tax-free reorganization. 90 "Substantially all" of the transferor corporation's assets need not be acquired, as in a C reorganization. 91 The
transferor corporation may dispose of assets which the transferee corporation does not want prior to the transaction. 92 In
addition, a no "control" requirement exists. 93 However, courts
have interpreted the continuity of interest doctrine to require
that stock of the acquiring corporation comprise a substantial
part of the consideration. 94 Under the current guidelines of
251(a)(1953):
Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws
of this State may merge into a single corporation,
which may be any 1 of the constituent corporations
or may consolidate into a new corporation formed
by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of
merger or consolidation, as the case may be, complying and approved in accordance with this section.
Id.
86. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-42. For example, unlike
the types Band C reorganizations, the type A reorganization imposes no restrictions on the kind of consideration to be used in a statutory merger or consolidation.Id.
87. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West 1988).
88. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107 (West 1988).
89. See BITI'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-42.
90. Jack F. Thome, Mergers of Corporations Can Take Various Forms Each
With Its Own Tax Consequences, TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS, 35 T.A 38 (July
1985).
91. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-42. Thus, for example, an
A reorganization is generally the preferred vehicle where target has distributed
unwanted assets prior to the reorganization by means of a spin-off or redemption.
BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6.
92. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-47.
93. See id. at 12-42. For example, in a B reorganization, "control" means ownership of at least 80% of the total combined voting power of voting stock and at
least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock. See I.R.C. §
368(c).
94. See, e.g., Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332 (5th
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the Service, a favorable ruling that a merger qualifies as an A
reorganization requires that the shareholders of the acquired
corporation receive at least 50% equity consideration. 95
The principal disadvantages of an A reorganization are the
often burdensome requirements of meeting securities laws,
preparation of numerous documents, and providing the approval and appraisal rights to acquirer shareholders as mandated
under applicable state law. 96 In addition, because the target
corporation's assets and liabilities transfer to the acquiring
corporation by operation of law, the acquiring corporation cannot choose which of the target's liabilities it will assume. 97
2. "B" Reorganizations
A "B" reorganization is defined as the acquisition of stock
of one corporation in exchange "solely" for all or part of the
voting stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent,98 but
not both,99 provided the acquiring corporation is in control of

Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
95. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. But see John A. Nelson Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (38%); Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415 (1936)
(25%).
96. Thorne, supra note 90, at 38.
97. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6, A-7.
98. "Parent" is the purchasing or acquiring corporation which desires to make
an acquisition, either directly or through its subsidiary.
99. In a standard B reorganization, stock of the parent corporation or of its
subsidiary may be used, but not both. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c). This limitation
is intended to ensure that a shareholder of the target corporation cannot cash out
part of her investment without losing a proportionate share of her interest in the
transferred assets. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 217, stating:
For example, suppose that A Corp acquired all the
stock of T Corp in exchange for its own stock as
well as stock of its parent. If a (former) shareholder of T Corp sold the stock of A's parent, the
shareholder would obtain cash from the transaction
without substantially diluting his interest in A (and
through A, in T).
[d.

Were such transactions permitted, the force of the "solely voting stock to
acquire control" requirement of the B reorganization would be reduced. [d. Although beyond the scope of this discussion, one may want to reconsider this point
in the context of divisive reorganizations because the effect of using stock of both
the parent and its subsidiary in a standard B reorganization could be to turn the
B into a divisive reorganization. [d. at 217-218.
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the acquired corporation immediately after the transaction. 100
"Control" requires the possession of stock representing at least
80% of both the total combined voting power of all the acquired
corporation's voting stock and the total number of shares of all
other classes of the corporation's stock. 101
An "acquisition" may consist of a series of acquisitions that
are part of the same transaction. 102 Generally, aggregation is
permitted for acquisitions "taking place over a relatively short
period of time such as 12 months.,,103 Although aggregation
may allow earlier acquisitions to qualify for nonrecognition
treatment even though control did not exist after such earlier
acquisitions,104 it may also serve to disqualify the whole series of acquisitions if any of them involved any consideration
other than voting stock. 105 If the earlier stock purchase were
unrelated or sufficiently remote in time,106 however, it would
not violate the "solely for voting stock" requirement of Section
368(a)(1)(B).107
The "solely for voting stock" requirement has been strictly
applied by the Service and the courtS. 108 Even if the acquiring
corporation acquired more than 80% of the acquired
corporation's stock in exchange for its voting stock, the entire
transaction is taxable if it acquired any stock for nonvoting
stock consideration 109 as part of the same acquisition. no A
100. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(B). CEB, supra note 2, at 94.
101. I.R.C. Section 368(c). The relevant question is whether the acquiring corporation is in control immediately after the acquisition, and not whether control
existed before, or as a result of, the acquisition. I.R.C. Section 368(aX1)(B) (last
parenthetical); Reg, § 1.368-2(c). CEB, supra note 2, at 94.
102. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-53.
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c).
104. Referred to as a "creeping" B reorganization.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c). CEB, supra note 2, at 94.
106. Often referred to as being "old and cold."
107. See Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856, 861-862 (1st Cir. 1980)
(holding that however much stock of the target corporation is acquired in the
transaction, the total consideration furnished by the acquiring corporation must be
its voting stock or voting stock of its parent). However, the court reasoned that
"old and cold" stock need not have been acquired solely for voting stock. [d. at
862, 875.
108. [d. See also Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194
(1942). The voting stock may be common or preferred, or both. Rev Proc. 77-37,
1977-2 C.B. 568.
109. Cash, for example, may constitute nonvoting stock consideration.
110. Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1980). See generally
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limited exception to the "no boot in a B"lll rule allows an acquiring corporation to pay cash in lieu of fractional shares of
stock. u2
Although a B reorganization requires absolute compliance
with the "solely for voting stock" requirement, there is no requirement that the target corporation hold substantially all of
its historic assets following the acquisition. u3 Thus, a B reorganization provides flexibility in acquiring a target corporation
that, prior to the acquisition, has distributed unwanted assets
to its shareholders. 114 In addition, because a B reorganization
constitutes an acquisition of stock of the target, the liabilities
of the target do not become liabilities of the acquiring corporation as they would in an A reorganization or possibly a C reorganization. U5
3. "C" Reorganizations
The "C" reorganization more closely resembles the A reorganization than the B reorganization does because the C reorganization contemplates a transfer of assets U6 rather than a
transfer of stock.117 The C reorganization is defined as the
acquisition by one corporation of "substantially all" the properties of another corporation in exchange solely for voting stock
of the acquiring corporation or its parent, but not both. uB The

Dailey, The Voting Stock Requirement of B and C Reorganizations, 26 TAX L. REv.
725 (1971).
Ill. The tenn "boot" is not defined in the Code. Boot refers to cash or other
nonpennitted property that triggers recognition when received in an otherwise taxfree exchange. See BITI'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 11-53, 11-54. For example, boot may refer to consideration such as nonvoting stock, debt securities,
cash or other property. [d.
112. Rev. Rul. 66-365, 1966-2 C.B. 116. CEB, supra note 2, at 95.
113. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-3S.
114. [d. Also, the absence of the "substantially all" requirement adds flexibility
in post-acquisition restructuring. [d.
115. This difference is due to the fact that the target corporation remains as
the subSidiary of the acquiring parent corporation. [d. See infra notes 117-144 and
accompanying text for a discussion of C reorganizations.
116. As in a merger. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 21S.
117. As in a B reorganization. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 21S.
In fact, the C reorganization is so similar to the A reorganization that it often is
called the "de facto" (or practical) merger provision. [d.
l1S. I.R.C. Section 36S(aXIXC). It should be noted, however, that if SO% of the
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Service has ruled that the transfer constituting 90% of the
target's net assets and 70% of the target's gross assets will
constitute "substantially all.,,1l9 Generally, the acquired corporation must liquidate following the transaction. 120
As in a B reorganization, the statute ensures continuity of
proprietary interest in a C reorganization by limiting the consideration that can be used by the acquiring corporation to
voting stoCk. 121 However, in contrast to the strict application
of the "solely for voting stock" requirement of B reorganizations, some leeway is provided the acquiring corporation in a C
reorganization through two provisions: Section 368(a)(1)(C)
(final clause) and Section 368(a)(2)(B).122
The final clause in Section 368(a)(1)(C) provides that assumption by the acquiring corporation of debts of the target
corporation does not constitute impermissible consideration in
determining qualification as a C reorganization. 123 This final
clause provision overturns the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Hendler,124 which had held that assumption
of a liability, even in the context of a bulk transfer of corporate
assets, should be treated as the equivalent of cash consideration. 125 Because most companies are forced to mortgage
their fixed or working assets to obtain commercial credit, continuation of the Hendler doctrine would have had the effect of
rendering the C reorganization commercially unavailable. 126
Section 368(a)(2)(B), the ''boot relaxation rule,,,127 permits

target's assets are exchanged for voting stock of the acquiring corporation or of its
parent, use of the other's stock may be permissible under the boot relaxation rule
of I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B).
119. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
120. This liquidation requirement can be avoided only with the permission of
the Secretary of the Treasury. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(G)(ii).
121. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 218; see also BITIKER AND
EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-69, 12-70.
122. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 218.
123. See id at 219.
124. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
125. See id. at 566-567.
126. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 219.
127. Under the "boot relaxation rule" of I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(B), up to 20
percent of the consideration can consist of property other than stock of a party to
the reorganization, although the 20 percent limitation is reduced by the amount of
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the acquiring corporation to use cash or other booe28 as consideration in a C reorganization as long as 80 percent of the
target's assets are acquired solely for voting stoCk. 129 One
drawback to taxpayers who obtain benefits under Section
368(a)(2)(B) is that they must relinquish the benefit of the
anti-Hendler language contained in Section 368(a)(1)(C).13o
Thus, if boot is used in a C reorganization, then any liabilities
assumed by the acquiring corporation are treated as boot for
the purposes of the boot relaxation rule of Section
368(a)(2)(C).13l
One of the pitfalls inherent in the C reorganization arises
when the solely for voting stock requirement is applied to an
acquiring corporation which had previously purchased stock in
the target corporation. 132 Assuming that the acqUlnng
corporation's stock ownership falls short of control,l33 an immediate liquidation of the target following the assets acquisition may invite the application of the step transaction doctrine. 134 The step transaction doctrine would then
recharacterize a portion of the acquisition as an exchange for
the target's stock. 135 As a result, the acquiring corporation
may not be able to meet the solely for voting stock requirement. 136 To avoid this problem, the acquiring corporation may
liabilities assumed by the acquiring corporation. See id.
128. See BITIKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 11-53, 11-54.
129. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 219.
130. ld.
131. ld.
132. CEB, supra note 2, at 96.
133. So that an I.R.C. § 332 tax-free liquidation is unavailable. ld.
134. ld.
135. ld.
136. See Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). In that case, the acquiring corporation
owned 79% of the target corporation's stock. See id. In order to obtain the assets
of the target corporation, the acquiring corporation exchanged its voting stock for
the target's assets. See id. The target then liquidated, distributing 79% of the
acquiring corporation's stock back to the acquiring corporation and 21% of the
stock to the target's minority shareholders. See id.
The court held that this transaction failed to qualify as a tax-free C reorganization because the acquiring corporation obtained 79% of the target's assets in
exchange for its stock of the target and only 21% of the target's assets in exchange for its own voting stock. See id. Hence, the transaction was treated as a
taxable liquidation rather than as a tax-free reorganization. See id. As corporate
tax professors Abrams and Doernberg noted:
While the court's holding arguably is consistent
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have to sell the previously acquired stock before proceeding
with the asset acquisition 137 or to use a controlled subsidiary
to make the acquisition. 138
From a purely tax standpoint, a C reorganization is generally less attractive than an A reorganization due to the amount
of both disclosed and hidden liabilities typically assumed in the
acquisition of an ongoing business. 139 In a C reorganization,
great difficulty lies in ensuring that the 20% boot exception to
the "solely for voting stock" requirement is a sufficient cushion
from disqualification. 140 However, from a nontax perspective,
the use of a C reorganization may be advantageous. 141 For
instance, it may not be possible to merge the target corporation
into the acquiring corporation under applicable state or federal
merger laws. 142 Also, unlike an A reorganization, a C reorganization offers the acquiring corporation the ability to choose
which of the target corporation's liabilities it will assume. 143
Finally, only the target corporation shareholders may be entitled to approval and appraisal rights, whereas both acquiring
with the tenns of the statute, the "solely for voting stock" requirement seems intended to ensure
that the target shareholders continue a proprietary
interest in the continuing enterprise. The holding in
Bausch & Lomb serves to invalidate a transaction
when the acquiring corporation is itself a substantial shareholder of the target corporation, a
situation in which the continuity of proprietary interest is most evident.
ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 220.
137. Rev. Rul. 72-354, 1972-2 C.B. 188.
138. See discussion of triangular reorganizations, infra notes 164-229 and accompanying text.
139. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17.
140. See id. Even if it appears that a tax planner knows the amount of liabilities assumed or the boot involved, additional boot may be hidden in a number of
places, such as contingent or escrowed stock arrangements, employment agreements, and assumptions of shareholder-guaranteed debt. [d. The "substantially all"
and liquidation requirements may present additional difficulties. Id. Moreover,
unlike a merger, title to the target corporation's assets may be physically transferred to the acquiring corporation, a process which can be time-consuming and expensive. Id.
141. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17.
142. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-465, 1957-2 C.B. 250; George v. Commissioner, 26
T.C. 396 (1956), acq., 1956-2 C.B. 5. This is especially true when the target corporation possesses a special charter, such as where the target corporation is a bank
or an insurance company. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17.
143. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-17, A-18.
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and target shareholders usually have these rights under Section 368(a)(1)(A).144
4. Nondivisive "D" Reorganizations
A nondivisive "D" reorganization most closely resembles
the C reorganization. l45 Both involve a transfer of "substantially all" of a corporation's assets, followed by a complete liquidation of the transferor .146 The two may be distinguished,
however, by the statutory implementation of the continuity of
proprietary interest doctrine. 147 In the C reorganization, continuity is ensured by the requirement that the transferee corporation obtain the assets in exchange for the voting stock of
itself or its parent. l48 In the nondivisive D reorganization,
continuity is ensured by the requirement that the transferor or
its shareholders have "control" of the transferee immediately
after the exchange. 149
Nondivisive D reorganizations are primarily used by the
Service and the courts to control reincorporation abuses. 150
The nondivisive D reorganization provides the Service with a
statutory weapon to limit the use of a corporate liquidation,
preceded or followed by a transfer of assets to a new or existing corporation, as a device to achieve unwarranted tax objectives. 151 Such a liquidation-reincorporation, if successful,
could be significant because it would allow the following tax
advantages: (1) a bailout of cash or property taxed as capital
gains, (2) the generation of capital losses, (3) a stepped-up
basis for depreciable property, (4) the elimination of the ordinary income taint on Section 306 stock/52 and (5) the elimi144. Id. at A-lB.
145. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Where a transaction qualifies as both a C and a D reorganization, it is
treated as a D. See l.R.C. Section 36B(a)(2)(A).
150. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222.
151. See id. at 223.
152. Stock subject to the disabilities of § 306, called "tainted stock," is defined
in § 306(c). ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 162. Any stock other than
common stock distributed by a corporation is I.R.C. § 306 stock if received by the
taxpayer tax-free under I.R.C. § 305(a). See id. The definition of § 306 stock also
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nation of the earnings and profits account. 153 The shareholders could then use Section 351 to reincorporate without recognition of gain. 1M However, it should be noted that the substantial repeal of the General Utilities doctrine 155 by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 has reduced the incentives for a liquidation-reincorporation. 156
To diminish the trouble that the Service had in meeting
the 80% control definition, the Service uses the control definition of Section 304(c).157 The definition of "control" is relaxed
in the case of nondivisive D reorganizations from the usual
80% test down to the 50% test of the Section 304(c) anti-abuse
provision. 158 Because the taxpaying shareholders are in control of the new corporation after the transaction, the terms of
the nondivisive D reorganization will have been met. 159 Ac-

includes stock received in a tax-free reorganization if receipt of the stock had the
effect of a stock dividend. Id. A taxable disposition of § 306 stock generally will
produce ordinary income to the transferor. Id. at 165. However, § 306 contains a
number of exceptions to its strict rules; the relevant exception here being that §
306 does not cover the disposition of § 306 stock as part of the complete liquidation of a corporation. Id. at 167. Because the earnings and profits of a corporation
are bailed out at capital gains rates in a complete liquidation, there is no reason
to treat the disposition of the § 306 stock in this manner as an abusive bailout,
unless the taxpayer was effecting a liquidation-reincorporation transaction. See id.
153. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222-223.
154. See id. at 223.
155. The General Utilities doctrine arose from the 1935 Supreme Court decision
in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), a case
which shaped corporate taxation for over 50 years. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra
note 12, at 90. Under the repealed General Utilities doctrine, a distributing corporation recognized no gain or loss on a distribution of property with respect to a
shareholder's stock. Id. A corporation which distributed assets in kind in complete
liquidation did not recognize any gain on the distribution. BNA, No. 770, supra
note 83, at A-5. However, with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, although I.R.C. §
311(a) still provides nonrecognition of gain or loss on a distribution with respect to
stock, I.R.C. § 311(b) now provides that a distributing corporation must recognize
gain on a distribution of property where the fair market value exceeds the a<ljusted basis of the property. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 90-91. The
gain will be recognized as if the property had been sold to the shareholders at
fair market value. Id. at 91.
156. See BNA, No. 770, supra note 83, at A-5. See supra note 155 for a discussion of the effect of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
157. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222. I.R.C. Section 304(c) defines control as "the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock." See § 304(c).
158. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 222.
159. Id. at 223.
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cordingly, no loss will be recognized at the corporate level/GO
the corporation's earnings and profits account will not be eliminated,161 and the shareholders will be prohibited from recognizing any loss on the transaction. 162 Moreover, any cash removed from the corporate solution will be taxable to the shareholders. 163

C.

TRIANGULAR REORGANIZATIONS

As contrasted with the typical two-party reorganizations, a
"triangular" reorganization entails a reorganization between
three parties. In a triangular reorganization, the consideration
for the stock or assets of the target corporation includes stock
of a parent corporation in control of the acquiring corporation. 1M The transaction could be structured as a normal A, B,
or C reorganization in which the controlling corporation acquired the stock or assets of the acquired corporation in exchange for its own stock, followed by a distribution of the stock
or assets to the controlling corporation's subsidiary under the
"drop-down" provisions of Section 368(a)(2)(C).165 However, a
triangular reorganization achieves the same result in a single
step. 166

A corporate acquirer may choose to effect a triangular
reorganization to circumvent the Section 368(a)(2)(C) dropdown provisions. 167 An acquiring parent corporation may also
wish to avoid an expensive and burdensome vote of its public

160. See I.R.C. § 361(a)-(b).
161. See I.R.C. §§ 381(a)(2), (c)(2).
162. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 356(a).
163. See I.R.C. § 356. Taxpaying shareholders have unsuccessfully tried to avoid
the nondivisive D reorganization by reincorporating only a small portion of their
assets. See Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981).
164. BITl'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77, 12-78.
165. P. WEIDENBRUCH, JR. AND K. BURKE, supra note 9, at 208.
166. Sections 368(a)(1)(B) and 368(a)(1)(C) expressly permit a B or C reorganization, respectively, to be structured as a direct acquisition of the acquired
corporation's stock or assets in exchange for voting stock of the acquiring
corporation's parent. In an A reorganization, two types of triangular structures are
permitted under § 368(a)(2)(D) ("forward triangular reorganization") and §
368(a)(2)(E) ("reverse triangular reorganization"), respectively. See P. WEIDENBRUCH,
JR. AND K. BURKE, supra note 9, at 208-209.
167. See BITl'KER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77.
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shareholders on the transaction. l68 Furthermore, an acquiring corporation will normally seek a means to insulate itself
from the target corporation's liabilities, both disclosed and
undisclosed. 169 However, the acquiring corporation likely does
not wish to give target shareholders shares of its subsidiary,
which would create an unwanted minority interest. 17o Moreover, the target shareholders normally will want shares in the
parent corporation rather than a typically unmarketable minority stock interest in the parent corporation's subsidiary.171
Because the use of the drop-down provisions cannot achieve all
of these objectives,172 the triangular merger alternatives are
the most commonly used acquisition techniques. 173
1. History of Triangular Reorganizations

In two early Supreme Court cases, the Court held that
triangular acquisitions failed to qualify as reorganizations
because the shareholders of the target corporation did not have
a continuity of interest in the target's assets due to the fact
that they held stock of the parent corporation rather than that
of the transferee corporation. 174 These two cases, which established the so-called Groman-Bashford doctrine,175 virtually
barred triangular acquisitions from qualifying under the reorganization provisions. 176
168. [d.
169. MARTIN D. GINSBURG, ESQ. AND JACK S. LEVIN, ESQ., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, at 8202 (vol. F5, 1993).
170. BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77.
171. [d.

172. Cook and Coalson, Jr., The "Substantially All of the Properties" Requirement in Triangular Reorganizations- A Current Review, 35 TAX LAW. 303, 313 n.
39 (Winter 1982). For instance, if the target is merged into parent and parent
then drops all of targets assets subject to all its liabilities, down to a whollyowned subsidiary, parent generally remains responsible for target's liabilities even
after the drop-down. See id.
173. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-79.
174. Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302
U.S. 454 (1938).
175. The Groman-Bashford doctrine, which arose from two Supreme Court decisions, Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937) and Helvering v. Bashford,
302 U.S. 454 (1938), prevented the use of triangular acquisitions. See BITTKER AND
EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-240. The doctrine maintained that stock of the acquiring corporations parent company did not carry the requisite continuity of interest "genes." [d.
176. See BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-240.
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In 1954, the reorganization provisions were amended to
allow the stock or assets received in an A, B, or C reorganization to be distributed to a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation promptly after the exchange. 177 Since 1954, the Code has
allowed both B and C reorganizations to be accomplished by
use of the voting stock of the parent corporation or its subsidiary, but not both. 178 Subsequently, the Service published two
landmark rulings in 1967179 which treated triangular mergers as either B or C reorganizations, depending on whether
subsidiary or target survived the merger, provided that the
necessary voting stock requirements were met. 180

Revenue Ruling 67-326 dealt with a prestatutory forward
triangular merger involving a direct transfer of assets by the
target corporation to the acquiring corporation's controlled
subsidiary in exchange for stock of the parent. 181 The Service
held that such a transaction could not qualify for tax-free
treatment as a Type A reorganization because the parent was
not a party to the reorganization. 182 However, the Service
ruled that the transaction could qualify for nonrecognition
treatment as a Type C reorganization if the conditions of Section 368(a)(1)(C) were met. l83
Similarly, Revenue Ruling 67-448 involved a prestatutory
reverse triangular merger.l84 In Revenue Ruling 67-448, the
Service held that a reverse triangular merger qualified as a
Type B reorganization where a parent corporation merged a
newly created subsidiary into the acquired target corporation. l85 Thus, Revenue Rulings 67-326 and 67-448 laid the

177. See I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(C).
178. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 217, 221.
179. Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144 (transitory Subsidiary merges into Target in B reorganization); Rev. Rul. 67-326, 1967-2 C.B. 143 (merger of Target into
Subsidiary for Parent stock qualifies as C reorganization).
180. New York State Bar Association Tax Section [hereinafter "NYSBATS"),
Comment, Report on Reverse Triangular Mergers and Basis-Nonrecognition Rules in
Triangular Reorganizations, 36 TAX L. REV. 395, 397 (1981).
181. Bl'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-44.
182. ld.
183. ld.
184. ld. at 12-45.
185. ld.
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foundation for the codification of forward and reverse triangular reorganizations, respectively.186
Not until 1969 did the Code allow triangular mergers to
qualify as Type A reorganizations. 187 In 1969, Section
368(a)(2)(D) was enacted to permit a "forward" triangular
merger of target into subsidiary provided that the subsidiary
use only the parent stock to acquire "substantially all" of the
properties of the target. 188 The Code also required that the
transaction would have qualified as a statutory A reorganization had the target merged directly into the parent. 189
In 1971, Section 368(a)(2)(E) was enacted to permit a "reverse" triangular merger. In a Section 368(a)(2)(E) transaction,
the subsidiary merges into the target provided that, "in the
transaction," the target's shareholders exchange for parent
voting stock an amount of target stock which constitutes Section 368(c) "control.,,190 These statutory changes acknowledge
that a functionally identical tax result could have been
achieved under prior law through a direct merger of the acquired corporation into the parent, and through a Section
368(a)(2)(C) drop-down of the acquired assets into one or more
of the parent's controlled subsidiaries. 19l Sections 368(a)(2)(D)
and 368(a)(2)(E) do not, however, alter the definition of the
type A reorganization. 192 These sections create a fourth and
fifth category of acquisitive reorganization, incorporating elements of the type A, type B and type C patterns, while adding
their own unique requirements. 193

186. [d.

187. BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77.
188. NYSBATS, supra note 180, at 397-398.
189. BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-77.
190. NYSBATS, supra note 180, at 398. I.R.C. Section 368(c) defines control as
"the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." See § 368(c).
191. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 12-78.
192. [d. at 12-78, 12-79.
193. [d. at 12-79.
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2. Forward Triangular Reorganizations
AI:. discussed,194 the standard two-party merger transaction between the acquiring corporation and the target corporation may result in substantial nontax problems. 195 First, the
acquiring corporation becomes automatically liable for all the
debts of the target corporation, including unknown or undisclosed debts. 196 For example, there may be significant target
liabilities such as environmental clean-up responsibilities,
product liabilities, employee discrimination claims, anti-trust
claims, asserted tax deficiencies, or other threatened or pending lawsuits. 197 Also, the target corporation may have hidden
liabilities, such as underfunded pension plans, burdensome
long-term debt covenants, or labor problems. 198 If the target
is merged into the parent and the parent then drops all of
target's assets, subject to all its liabilities, down to a whollyowned subsidiary, the parent would generally remain responsible for the target's liabilities even after the drop-down. 199

Second, the acquiring corporation and the target corporation must obtain shareholder approval to effectuate the transaction. 2°O When the acquiring corporation is publicly-held, it
may be expensive and troublesome to obtain the necessary
approval of its shareholders. 201 Finally, both corporations face
possible exposure for dissenting shareholder claims.202 To
avoid these problems, planners may use a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation to effect the forward triangular merger. 203

194. See supra notes 84-144 and accompanying text for prior discussion of the
nontax problems inherent in a standard merger transaction.
195. BNA, No. 770, supra note 83, at A-l44.
196. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-6, A-7.
197. MARTIN D. GINSBURG, ESQ. AND JACK S. LEVIN, ESQ., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, at 8202 (vol. F5, 1993).
198. [d.
199. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 313, n. 39.
200. For example, under California statute, Cal. Corp. Code § 1201 (1995), a
merger reorganization must be approved by both corporations' shareholders.
201. Thorne, supra note 90, at 38.
202. GINSBURG AND LEVIN, supra note 169, at 8222.
203. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 225. For instance, if the
target corporation merges into a subsidiary of acquiring parent corporation, then
approval of the subsidiary's shareholders is easy to obtain, because that approval
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In the typical Section 368(a)(2)(D) forward triangular
merger, the parent corporation forms a subsidiary, usually
with nominal capitalization, and the target corporation is then
merged into the surviving subsidiary. 2M In the merger, the
former shareholders of the target receive the parent's stock, or
other consideration in exchange for their target stock. 205 The
only limitation imposed on the consideration transferred to the
target shareholders is that applicable to A reorganizations. 206
That is, a forward triangular merger qualifies for nonrecognition treatment only if: (1) the subsidiary acquires "substantially all" the target's properties, (2) it does not use any of its own
stock in making the acquisition, and (3) the transaction would
have qualified as an A reorganization if the target had merged
directly into the parent corporation. 207 This transaction is the
A reorganization analog to the "parenthetical,,208 Band C reorganizations. 209
3. Reverse Triangular Reorganizations
Although the reverse triangular reorganization, codified in
Section 368(a)(2)(E), has been part of the tax law since 1971,
much uncertainty surrounded the tax treatment of this technique until the publication of regulations in 1985. 210 Subsequently, in the late 1980's an unusually large number of letter
rulings shed light on issues not dealt with by the 1985 regulations. 211

is merely approval by the board of directors of the acquiring parent corporation.
[d.
204. Id.
205. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 313.
206. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 226. See § 368(a)(2)(D)(ii).
207. CEB, supra note 2, at 97.
208. A "parenthetical" B or C reorganization occurs when stock of the acquiring
corporation's parent is used. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 217.
209. [d. at 226. While the triangular merger Treasury Regulations do not specifically provide for the acquiring of a related corporation, there is nothing in the
legislative history of the triangular merger provision to indicate that the section
was not intended to apply where such is the case. See Rev. Rul. 77-428, 1977-2
C.B. 118.
210. Robert Willens, Flexibility of Reverse Mergers Increased by Regs. and Rulings, 70 J.TAX'N 52 (Jan. 1989). See generally NYSBATS, supra note 180, discussing in 1981 the uncertainty surrounding 46 Fed. Reg. 112 (basis and nonrecognition rules), 114 (reverse triangular merger rules) (Jan. 2, 1981).
211. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(j).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/4

28

Ravazzini: Amalgamating Reorganizations

1996]

AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATIONS

569

The reverse triangular merger format involves the same
acquiring parent and the same target company as in the forward triangular merger, but it is used in situations in which it
is desirable for the target to survive the transaction and continue to hold its own properties. 212 Such a situation could
arise, for instance, where the target's shareholders are elderly
and wish to benefit from a stepped-up basis for their stock at
death. 213 However, the reverse triangular configuration is
usually dictated by important nontax considerations. 214 For
example, the target may hold a non-assignable franchise, favorable long-term lease, trademarks, or other valuable contract
rights that cannot be transferred without third-party approval. 215 Alternatively, the target corporation may be the debtor
under a loan agreement that triggers an acceleration of principal payments upon a substantial transfer of its assets. 216
Moreover, nontax state or federal regulatory requirements may
require preservation of the existing corporate identity of target.217 As a result of these considerations, the reverse triangular merger is commonly used in acquisitions involving
banks, insurance companies, public utilities and other highly
regulated industries. 218 In order to accomplish the acquisition, a parent corporation forms a new subsidiary, which is
merged into the target corporation. 219 Under the merger
agreement, the former target shareholders receive parent voting stock in exchange for their target stock and the parent becomes the sole shareholder of target. 220
Section 368(a)(2)(E) requires two important conditions for
a reverse triangular merger to receive tax-free reorganization
treatment:

212. See MARTIN D. GINSBURG, ESQ. AND JACK S. LEVIN, ESQ., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, at 1003 (vol. F1, 1993).
213. Id.
214. See BNA, No. 770, supra note 83, at A-67.
215. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. In addition, the existence of target corporation foreign branches or
subsidiaries requiring foreign governmental approval for a change in the target
corporation's control may warrant the use of a reverse triangular merger.
GINSBURG AND LEVIN, supra note 169, at 8203.
219. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 226.
220. See id.
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(1) Immediately after the transaction, the surviving target corporation must hold "substantially all" of its assets and the assets of the merged
subsidiary corporation, other than stock of the
parent corporation distributed in the
transaction. Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(3)(iii)
reiterates that the term "substantially all" has
the same meaning under Section 368(a)(2)(E) as
in the C reorganization context. 221

(2) In the transaction, the shareholders of the
target corporation must exchange target stock
constituting "control" of the target corporation
for parent voting stock. For this purpose, the
two-pronged "control" definition of Section 368(c)
applies: at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all voting stock; and at least 80%
in number of the shares of all classes of nonvoting stock. The Service interprets Section 368(c)
as requiring at least 80% in number of each
class of nonvoting stock. 222

Thus, a reverse triangular merger may qualify under Section
368(a)(2)(E) even though some consideration other than parent
voting stock223 passes from parent in exchange for target
shares. 224 However, the requirements of Section 368(a)(2)(E)
are more restrictive than those that apply to a forward triangular merger under Section 368(a)(2)(D).225 Thus, absent com221. The Service has ruled that the transfer constituting 90% of the target's net
assets and 70% of the target's gross assets will constitute "substantially all." Rev.
Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. See generally Cook and Coalson, Jr., The "Substantially All of the Properties" Requirement in Triangular Reorganizations- A Current
Review, 35 TAX LAw. 303 (1982).
222. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.368-2(j)(3)(i), 1.368-2(j)(3)(ii) (1960).
223. Up to 20 percent boot. See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(2)(E), 368(c).
224. If the nonvoting stock consideration takes the form of cash or other property, the recipients will be taxable under the reorganization boot rules of I.R.C. §
356 or, if solely cash or other property is received, under the redemption rules of
I.R.C. § 302. See Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 CB 112; Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 CB
118.
225. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(2)(D) does not require that parent stock be voting
stock. Also, in a forward triangular merger the amount of cash or other nonstock
consideration flowing from parent is constrained only by the nonstatutory "continuity of interest" doctrine: at least 50% stock is required for advance ruling purposes, but the courts have tolerated substantially lower percentages. See Section 3.02
of Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568; John A. Nelson Co., 296 U.S. 374 (1935)
(38%); Miller, 84 F.2d 415 (1936) (25%).
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pelling nontax reasons for keeping the target corporation alive,
the forward subsidiary merger is often the preferred vehicle for
tax-free triangular mergers. 226
The voting stock requirement of the reverse triangular
merger also differs from that of the B reorganization. 227 If the
acquiring corporation in a reverse triangular merger exchanges
voting stock for control of the target, it can use any consideration to acquire the remaining stock of the target. 228 However, because the acquiring corporation must "acquire" control of
the target in the transaction, the possibility for a "creeping" reverse triangular merger is substantially restricted. 229
III. DISCUSSION: THE LACK OF A UNIFYING PRINCIPLE
IN THE CURRENT AMALGAMATING
REORGANIZATION DEFINITIONS
The current amalgamating re.organization definitions are
full of detailed and complex principles, seemingly varied without rhyme or reason. 230 For example, the Code disparately
treats boot, continuity of interest, and the "substantially all"
test. 231 No tax policy justifies the Code's disparate treatment
of these various forms of reorganization. 232
Regarding boot, the motivation behind the the differences
in tax treatment of the following remains a mystery: (1) 50%
boot in direct mergers 233 and in forward triangular merg-

226. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. But see generally infra Section III-J entitled "Taxable Forward Or Reverse Triangular Merger?" See also Los Angeles County Bar Association Section of Taxation, LA Bar Members Advocate Consistent
Treatment For Taxable Mergers, TAX NOTES TODAY, (June 10, 1992) at 92 TNT
120-33 [hereinafter "LACBAST"] (discussing the higher tax risks involved in failed
forward triangular mergers).
227. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 226.
228. 1d.
229. 1d. at 226-227. See infra Section III-A entitled "Creeping Reverse Triangular Mergers."
230. ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 233.
231. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Article, A Suggested Alternative Approach to
the Senate Finance Committee Staffs 1985 Proposals for Revising the Merger and
Acquisition Provisions, 5 VA. TAX REV. 599, 624-625 (Spring 1986).
232. 1d.
233. See I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(A).
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ers,234 (2) 20% boot in reverse triangular mergers 235 and in
certain stock-for-asset acquisitions/36 and (3) no boot in stock
for stock acquisitions. 237 Similarly, the Code permits nonvoting common or preferred stock to qualify for continuity of interest purposes in direct mergers 238 and in forward triangular
mergers. Z39 However, the Code requires voting stock for continuity of interest purposes for: (1) stock-for-stock acquisitions
under Section 368(a)(1)(B), (2) stock-for-asset acquisitions under Section 368(a)(1)(C), and (3) reverse triangular mergers
under Section 368(a)(2)(E).240 No justification apparently exists for these disparities. 241
From a tax policy perspective, it is peculiar that a "substantially all" test would be applied to a stock-for-asset reorganizations,242 and to both forward and reverse triangular
mergers,243 but not to a direct merger or a stock-for-stock acquisition. 244 As a result of the "substantially all" test, it is
virtually impossible to spin-off45 a target's assets in a taxfree transaction under Section 355 prior to effectuating an
acquisitive reorganization under Sections 368(a)(1)(C), (2)(D),
or (2)(E).246 However, it is possible to combine a target's preacquisition spin-off with a later merger under Section
368(a)(1)(A).247 This later merger may be accomplished by either merging the distributing target into the acquiring

234. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(2)(D).
235. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(2)(E).
236. See I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(C)
237. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(1)(B). See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625.
238. See I.RC. Section 368(a)(1)(A).
239. See I.RC. Section 369(a)(2)(D).
240. See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625.
241. [d.
242. I.RC. Section 368(a)(1)(C).
243. I.R.C. Sections 368(a)(2)(D) and (2)(E).
244. I.R.C. Section 368(a)(1)(B). See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625.
245. A "spin-oft" involves the pro rata distribution by a corporation of stock of a
subsidiary to the corporation's shareholders. Matthew M. McKenna and Kirsten
Scblenger, How to meet the five tests spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups must pass to
provide tax benefits, TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS, 35 TAX'N ACCTS 298 (May 1985).
Because the distributee shareholders do not surrender anything in exchange for
the stock, spin-offs resemble § 301 distributions. See id.
246. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 626. See, e.g., Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal
Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 (1938).
247. See Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
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corporation248 or by merging the spun-off controlled corporation into the acquiring corporation. 249 It is also possible to
have a target spin-off unwanted assets in a Section 355 transaction prior to the acquisition of the distributing target by the
acquiring corporation in a stock-for-stock reorganization under
Section 368(a)(1)(B).250
At a minimum, uniformity should exist regarding boot,
continuity of interest, and "substantially all" requirements for
each form of amalgamating reorganization. 251 This lack of
uniformity is especially evident within the triangular reorganization provisions. 252 The remainder of this discussion will primarily focus on the asymmetry in treatment of forward and reverse triangular mergers.
A. CREEPING REVERSE TRIANGULAR MERGERS

Prior to the 1985 regulations, much uncertainty surrounded the tax treatment of creeping reverse triangular mergers.253 It was unclear if such a reorganization was even permissible, although creeping reorganizations were allowed in
forward triangular mergers. 254 A creeping reverse triangular
merger is an acquisition in which the parent corporation already owns more than 20% of the target stock and thus cannot
acquire the requisite 80% in the merger. 255 Tax practitioners
believed that such transactions were permissible due to both
the reverse triangular merger's B reorganization lineage, and
Regulation Section 1.368-2(c), which allows creeping B reorganizations. 256

248. ld.
249. See Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125.
250. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 626. See Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B.
83; but
Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1 C.B. 80 (no B reorganization where stock of
spun-off corporation acquired in a purported B).
251. See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 625-627.
252. See S. REp. No. 91-1553, 91ST CONG., 20 SESS. AT 2 (1970).
253. See Willens, supra note 210, at 52; see generally C. MACLEAN, CREEPING
ACQUISITIONS, 21 TAX L. REV. 345 (1966). A creeping reverse triangular merger is
an acquisition in which the parent corporation already owns more than 20% of the
target stock and thus cannot acquire the requisite 80% in the merger.
254. See Willens, supra note 210, at 52.
255. ld.
256. ld. Moreover, many tax practitioners read Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 C.B.

cr.
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The 1985 regulations, however, clearly dispelled the notion
that creeping reverse triangular mergers were permissible. 257
Indeed, Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(3)(i) stated that in such a
transaction the target shareholders must surrender control258
of the surviving corporation in exchange for voting stock of the
controlling corporation. 259 The amount of stock constituting
control is measured immediately before the transaction. 260
Although the "immediately before" analysis invites step-transaction problems,261 Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(3)(i) states
that redeemed stock is not treated as outstanding so long as
the target furnishes the redemption. 262 Thus, redemptions are
not fatal to Section 368(a)(2)(E) treatment as long as the survivor is not reimbursed, directly or indirectly, for redemption
costS. 263
Perhaps compelled by the literal language of the statute,
the disparate treatment of forward and reverse triangular
mergers is nonetheless unwarranted because it ignores Section
368's legislative purpose of eliminating the tax-incongruity of

124, as suggesting that creeping control and § 368(a)(2)(E) were not incompatible.
See ill. That ruling involved a reverse triangular merger that did not qualify under (a)(2)(E) because stock of a "grandparent" corporation was used and, at the
time of the merger, the merging subsidiary's parent (a first-tier sub) "already
owned a controlling interest" in target. See id. The implication was that an
(a)(2)(E) would be possible whenever the amount of stock obtained in the transaction was sufficient to raise the parent's interest to the 80% control level, regardless of how much stock was conveyed in the merger. [d. The only transaction
clearly barred from § 368 (a)(2)(E) was one in which a corporation already in
control sought to increase its percentage of ownership. [d.
257. 1d. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.368-2 (j)(3)(O and -2(j)(7), Examples (4) and (9).
258. "Control" in this situation constitutes 80 percent. See I.R.C. § 368(c).
259. Willens, supra note 210, at 52.
260. [d.
261. See generally Blanchard, Jr., The Effect of the Step-Transaction Doctrine on
Reverse Subsidiary Mergers: An Analysis, 55 J.TAX'N 72 (Aug. 1981).
262. Willens, supra note 210, at 52.
263. [d. See also Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2 CB 110, in which a contribution to a
target's capital by its new owner, made to defray a loan incurred to fund a redemption, was found to be a disguised payment of boot. [d.
In addition to redemption funds furnished by the target, the case law indicates that significant pre-merger stripouts of excess liquid or nonoperating assets
of target will not necessarily cause the "substantially all" requirement to be violated. See, e.g., Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981) (operating
assets only 15% of total assets); Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860
(3rd Cir. 1980) (19%); American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970)
(20%).
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forward and reverse triangular mergers. 264 Indeed, a 1970
Congressional report stated that there is "no reason why a
merger in one direction should be taxable, when the merger in
the other direction, under identical circumstances, is taxfree.,,265 Thus, the fact that a parent corporation already owns
more than 20% of the target stock will not preclude nonrecognition treatment in a forward triangular merger by itself.266
Moreover, there appears to be no sound policy reason why the
same circumstances should bar such treatment in reverse
triangular mergers. 267
Furthermore, application of the anti-creeping control rule
to reverse triangular mergers is peculiar given the historical
tie 268 between Section 368 (a)(2)(E) and the B reorganization,
where creeping control is clearly allowed. 269 One possible objection to creeping control could arise from a concern that a
creeping reorganization would allow a majority shareholder to
substitute a larger asset basis in the target for the parent
corporation's old stock basis. 270 However, the same result occurs when the parent owns no more than 20% of the target's
stock prior to the reorganization. 271 Surely no overriding legislative hostility is the cause of the disallowance of creeping
reverse triangular reorganizations since creeping reorganizations are also permitted by Sections 368(a)(1)(A) and
368(a)(2)(D).272

264. See Rev. Rul. 77-428, 1977-2 CB 118 ("The Committee Reports ... indicate that I.R.C. Section 368 (a)(2)(E) . . . was enacted to allow as a tax-free reorganization a transaction identical to a transaction described in Section 368
(a)(2)(D) except the surviving corporation was the acquired rather than the acquiring corporation.").
265. S. REP. No. 91-1553, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS. AT 2 (1970).
266. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80.
267. [d.
268. This historical tie is through Rev. Rul. 67-448. See infra section III-I entitled "The Availability of Revenue Ruling 67-448 as an Alternate Theory For Nonrecognition Treatment" for a discussion of Rev. Rul. 67-448.
269. Beller, supra note 65, at 80. I.R.C. Section 368 (a)(l)(B) requires that the
parent corporation control the target corporation "immediately after the acquisition, ... (whether or not such parent had control immediately before the acquisition)." [d.
270. NYSBATS, supra note 180, at 400.
271. [d.
272. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80.
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B. AsSET "PuSH-UPS" AND "DROP-DoWNS"
As previously discussed in Section II.C.3.,273 there are a
number of nontax reasons which make reverse triangular
mergers desirable. 274 One such nontax reason occurs when
the target holds valuable contracts or maintains favorable
banking relationships that make it desirable for the parent to
keep the target in existence. 275 However, after the reverse triangular merger has taken place, the parent corporation may
decide that it is best to conduct business as a single entity.276
An upstream merger, or "push-up," of the acquired corporation
into the parent will then allow an enterprise to conduct itself
as a single entity.277

Until recently, the Service employed the step-transaction
doctrine to collapse the reverse triangular and upstream mergers into one transaction arguing that the surviving corporation
no longer "holds" its properties as required by Section
368(a)(2)(E).278 At the same time, however, the Service allowed push-ups after forward triangular mergers because Section 368(a)(2)(D) merely requires that the subsidiary "acquires"
substantially all the target's properties. 279 However, in Letter
Ruling 94-20-027, the Service undertook a more reasonable
analysis of these transactions. 28o The Service held that the
273. See supra notes 210-229 and accompanying text for prior discussion of the
nontax problems inherent in a reverse triangular merger transaction.
274. See Emory, Swenson, Lerner and Fuller, Later Merger of Target Into Parent Was Single A Reorganization, 81 J.TAX'N 116, at 117 (Aug. 1994).
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. The Service would then test the transaction as a C reorganization,
but the arrangement often failed to qualify. Id. If consideration other than voting
stock of the parent corporation was used, or if the parent had a prior interest in
the target, disqualification as a C could result from the Bausch and Lomb doctrine
(See infra section III-F entitled "The Bausch and Lomb Problem" for an analysis of
the Bausch and Lomb doctrine). Id. The transaction would be a taxable purchase
of the target's assets, with that corporation recognizing corporate-level gain. Id.
The parent corporation would take a stepped-up (or stepped-down) basis in the
acquired assets. Id. Thus, what began as a qualifying reverse triangular merger
would change, by virtue of the later upstream merger, into a failed C reorganization. Id.
279. See Emory, Swenson, Lerner and Fuller, supra note 274, at 117_
280. Id. A more reasonable analysis would be to treat the parent as acquiring
the target assets directly in exchange for its stock. Id. Under this approach, the
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later upstream merger would be stepped into the prior reverse
triangular merger, even though it was decided to effect the upstream merger after the subsidiary was merged into the target. 281 Thus, the parent was treated as acquiring the target's
assets directly in exchange for its stock. 282
Another important nontax reason which makes triangular
mergers attractive is their ability to shelter the acquiring parent corporation from any undesirable target liabilities. 283 This
benefit is especially attractive when the target's assets are
subject to unknown or undisclosed liabilities. 284 For example,
a parent may merge with a target in a C reorganization and
drop all of the target's assets, subject to all its liabilities, down
into a wholly-owned subsidiary. In such a situation, the parent
generally would remain responsible for a target's liabilities
even after the drop-down. 285 To avoid this problem, planners
use a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation to
effect a triangular merger. 286
Proposed Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(4) would have provided that a significant post-merger transfer of assets by a
target to a controlled subsidiary, even though allowed by Section 368 (a)(2)(C), would fail to satisfy the "substantially all"
requirement of a reverse triangular merger. 287 Many practitioners found this proposal unjustified, since the Service permitted a Section 368(a)(2)(C) drop-down following a forward
triangular merger. 288 In 1985, however, Final Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(4) reconsidered asset drop-downs. 289 The Regulation stated that an otherwise qualifying Section 368(a)(2)(E)

transaction would be a good statutory merger of the target into the parent, under
§ 368 (a)(1)(A). [d. at 118. When analyzed as an A reorganization, the existence of
consideration other than voting stock would not defeat the transaction and there
would be no Bausch and Lomb problem as a result of the parent's prior ownership
of target stock. See id. (discussing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-20-027)(Feb. 18, 1994).
281. See Emory, Swenson, Lerner and Fuller, supra note 274, at 118.
282. [d.
283. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 313 n.39.
284. [d.
285. [d.
286. See ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 225.
287. Beller, supra note 65, at 80.
288. See Rev. Rul. 72-576, 1972-2 CB 217.
289. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(j)(4) (1960).
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will not fail "merely because . . . part or all of the assets of the
surviving corporation. .. or the merged corporation.. are
transferred to a corporation controlled by the controlling corporation .... "290 Tax attorney Herbert N. Beller, in an article
submitted to The Journal of Taxation,291 asserted:
[w]hile the obvious intention here was to describe the "dropdown" case, the language used
[in Reg. 1.368-2(j)(4)] describes instead a horizontal or "brother-sister" transfer of assets between two controlled subsidiaries of P. The reference to "the controlling corporation" is an
error; it should have read "the surviving corporation."292

The described brother-sister transfer is not protected by Section 368(a)(2)(C) because that provision requires direct control
of the transferee corporation by the transferor corporation. 293
C. CONSEQUENCES OF A PARENT'S AsSUMPTION OF A TARGET'S
LIABILITIES

Until the regulations of 1985, tax practitioners were concerned that an assumption of target's liabilities by a parent
might somehow trigger taxable boot consequences to a target
or its former shareholders in an otherwise qualifying reverse
triangular merger. 294 However, most practitioners believed
that liability assumption was a relatively safe maneuver in
light of Revenue Ruling 73_257. 295 Revenue Ruling 73-257
stated that a parent's assumption of a target's liabilities in a

290. [d. The Service maintains that a drop-down of target stock or assets to a
partnership will destroy continuity of interest if the transfer takes place as part of
the plan of reorganization, unless sufficient target stock or assets are retained at
the acquiror level. BNA, No. 771, supra note 54, at A-43 , A-44. Such a drop-down
could invalidate the prior reorganization, regardless of the extent of the parent's
interest in the partnership. [d. See GEN. COUNS. MEM. 35,117 (November 15,
1972); see also GEN. COUNS. MEM. 39,150 (Mar. 1, 1984).
291. Beller, supra note 65, at 80.
292. [d. n.41.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Rev. Rul. 73-257, 1973-1 CB 189.
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forward triangular merger transaction was protected under
Section 357(a), and therefore, that liability assumption did not
trigger taxable boot consequences. 296
Fortunately, Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(5) affirmed this
interpretation by permitting the parent corporation to assume
the target's liabilities. 297 The Service now treats the assumption as a contribution to the target's capital by the parent. 298
The parent's basis in the target's stock will then be increased
by the amount of the deemed contribution to capitaP99 Moreover, a contemporaneous exchange of target debt securities for
debt securities of the parent, or other securities of the target,
will not prevent qualification under Section 368(a)(2)(E) and
will be governed by the nonrecognition provisions of Sections
354 and 356. 300 Thus, taxable boot consequences will result
only where the principal amount of the securities received exceeds that of the securities surrendered. 30I Similarly, if the
target issues a debenture or other debt security to the parent
corporation for cash, the transaction will be considered separate. 302 Indeed, such a transaction will not affect qualification
of the reverse triangular merger. 303 Therefore, this regulation
represents a radical departure from B reorganization precedent.304

D.

THE "EARNINGS AND
COMMISSIONER V. CLARK

PROFITS"

PROBLEM

AFTER

When property is sold or exchanged, the Code generally
treats any resulting gain as capital gain, whereas gain from
the receipt of a dividend is normally treated as ordinary in296. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See Treas. Reg. § 1.118-l.
300. Beller, supra note 65, at 80.
30l. [d. See Rev. Rul. 79-155, 1979-1 CB 153 (dealing with I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) in
an I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(0) reorganization context).
302. [d.
303. [d. Cf Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969-1 CB 106 (same result in the B reorganization context).
304. Willens, supra note 210, at 52. Regarding B reorganizations, Revenue Ruling 69-142, 1969-1 CB 107, views a securities exchange separately from the reorganization, and therefore such transactions are taxable. [d.
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come. 305 Under Code Section 354(a)(1), however, gain from a
stock-for-stock exchange pursuant to a plan of reorganization
is not recognized in determining tax liability.30G If the exchange of stock in the reorganization is not solely for stock and
securities, but also includes boot, Section 356(a)(1) provides
that gain shall be recognized in an amount not in excess of the
fair market value of the property or the sum of money.307
Section 356(a)(2) controlls whether the gain is given capital
gain treatment (as exchanges of property generally are) or
ordinary income treatment. 30S Code Section 356(a)(2) provides
that, if the exchange has "the effect of the distribution of a
dividend,» the gain should be treated as a dividend and taxed
as ordinary income. 309 Otherwise, the gain would be characterized as gain from the exchange of property and taxed as
capital gains. 3lO
In Commissioner v. Clark,3ll the Supreme Court considered whether the payment of boot as part of a forward triangular merger had the "effect of a dividend" under Code Section
356(a)(2).312 The Court held that one should assume that a
pure stock-for-stock exchange followed by a post-reorganization
redemption of a portion of the stock had occurred. 313 In Clark,
the shareholder transferred 100 percent of the stock of the acquired corporation in a qualifying forward triangular reorganization for one percent of the stock of the acquiring corporation
and cash.314 The Court rejected the Service's position that the
receipt of the cash payment should be analyzed as if it were

305. Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 729 (1989).
306. I.R.C. Section 354(a)(1).
307. I.R.C. Section 356(a)(1).
308. I.R.C. Section 356(a)(2). Section 356(a)(2) specifies that if an "exchange . . .
has the effect of the distribution of a dividend," the boot must be treated as a
dividend and is therefore appropriately taxed as ordinary income.
309. See id. The safe-harbor provision of Section 302(b)(2) provides that a distribution in redemption of stock will not be treated as a dividend if it is "substantially disproportionate." I.R.C. Section 302(b)(2). This means that the shareholder
retained less than 80 percent of the voting and common stock of the corporation
after the redemption as said shareholder owned before the redemption. See I.R.C.
Section 302(c).
310. See I.R.C. Section 356(a)(2).
311. 489 U.S. 726 (1989).
312. [d. at 728-729.
313. [d. at 739-740.
314. [d. at 731-732.
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received immediately prior to the reorganization, which would
have resulted in the receipt being taxed as a dividend.315 Instead, the Court adopted the taxpayer's position that the receipt should be analyzed immediately after the reorganization,
as if the taxpayer had received solely stock in the reorganization and the acquiring corporation had redeemed some of the
stock for cash. 316 Under this analysis, the receipt of the cash
was taxed as a capital gain.317
Before the Clark decision, amalgamating reorganizations
in which the distributee-shareholder did not control both the
transferor and transferee corporations were relatively
clear. 3lB Only the earnings and profits of the transferor corporation were used to measure dividend income under Section
356(a)(2).319 Unfortunately, the Clark court considered only
whether the receipt of property other than stock or securities
as part of a forward triangular merger had the effect of a dividend distribution. 320 Since the Supreme Court concluded the
receipt of property did not have the effect of a dividend distribution, the Court did not address whose earnings and profits
should be used to measure the amount of a dividend distribution.321 This failure has created uncertainty.322 This current
uncertainty over whose earnings and profits should provide the
benchmark for distribution has been exacerbated by the
Service's inconsistent Letter Rulings issued after Clark. 323

315. Id. at 739. The dividend would have been taxed in proportion to the
shareholder's stock holdings. Id.
316. Clark, 489 U.S. at 739.
317. Id. at 740.
318. See Stewart and Fortin, The Correct E&P for Measuring Sec. 356(a)(2)
Dividend Income, 24 TAX ADVISER 404, 408 (July 1993).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 409.
321. Id.
322. See generally id. See also infra note 323 for a brief discussion of this uncertainty.
323. Id. at 411. For instance, private Letter Rulings 91-18-004 and 91-27-023
both involved § 368(a)(1)(D) acquisitive reorganizations and held that gains recognized by the transferor shareholders would be treated as a dividend under §
356(a)(2) to the extent of the combined Earnings and Profits of both the transferee
and transferor corporations. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 91-18-004 (Jan 30, 1991) and 91-27023 (Mar. 4, 1991). See Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970-1 CB 81; see also J. E. Davant,
366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966). However, private Letter Rulings 91-12-026 and 9143-082, which also dealt with acquisitive § 368(a)(1)(D) reorganizations, held, for
no apparent reason, that only the transferor's Earnings and Profits would be used
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Under the post-reorganization rationale of Clark, only the
parent's earnings and profits would be available to measure
the amount, if any, of dividend income in a triangular merger.324 The Service, however, could argue that Section
304(a)325 applies to reach the earnings and profits of both the
parent and target corporations by asserting that the subsidiary
accomplishes the redemption of the parent's stock. 326 Of
course, the application of Section 304(a) will have no effect if a
new subsidiary is the transferee in a forward triangular merger.327 However, it could be problematic in a reverse triangular
merger or where an existing subsidiary with earnings and
profits is used in the forward triangular merger. 32S
In a Letter Rulin~29 involving a reverse triangular merger,330 the Service used the parent's earnings and profits to
measure the potential Section 356(a)(2) dividend income. 331
The most likely explanation for this ruling entails the Service's
application of a "post-reorganization redemption" analysis to
determine whose earnings and profits should be used. 332 In
doing so, the Service reasoned that the parent's stock is hypothetically being redeemed, and therefore, the parent's earnings
and profits should be the benchmark to determine dividend
income.333

in determining the amount of dividend income to the transferor's shareholders.
Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 91-12-026 (Dec. 27, 1990) and 91-43-082 (Aug. 5, 1991). Since all
four Letter Rulings were issued after Clark, it seems some confusion exists within
the Service in regard to how the Clark decision affects the determination of whose
Earnings and Profits should be used in a § 356(a)(2) boot distribution. [d.; Priv.
Ltr. Ruls. 91-18-004 (Jan. 30, 1991) and 91-27-023 (Mar. 4, 1991).
324. Stewart and Fortin, supra note 318, at 410.
325. I.R.C. Section 304(a) provides for a redemption through the use of a related corporation. I.R.C. Section 304(a).
326. Stewart and Fortin, supra note 318, at 410.
327. [d. In this situation, the new subsidiary will not yet have any earnings
and profits. [d.
328. [d.
329. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-41-086 (July 19, 1990).
330. See supra notes 210-229 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion
of reverse triangular mergers.
331. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-41-086 (July 19, 1990). Stewart and Fortin, supra note
318, at 411.
332. [d.
333. Id.
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E. REVERSE TRIANGULAR MERGERS AND HOLDING COMPANY
FORMATIONS

There are two transactions available by which a widelyheld corporation with publicly traded debt securities may form
a holding company.334 Such a corporation could utilize an exchange offer, in which the new holding company's stock and
securities are exchanged for those of the existing entity.335
Alternatively, the corporation could use a reverse triangular
merger by creating two tiers of new corporations. 336 Therefore, the Section 368(a)(2)(E) transaction accomplishes economic results identical to that of the exchange offer. 337
However, a reverse triangular merger is preferable because Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(5) affords various tax advantages. 33S For example, a transferor-shareholder who only
owns securities is not a member of the requisite "control
group" of Section 351 since control under Section 351 is measured by stock, not security, ownership.339 Therefore, securities holders will be taxed on an exchange offer. 340 However, if
a Section 368 (a)(2)(E) occurs, the exchange of securities of the
controlling corporation for those of the surviving corporation is
governed by Section 354(a)(1).341 Where the debt instruments
qualify as securities, nonrecognition treatment is available so
long as the principal amount of the new securities does not
exceed that of the 01d. 342 Thus, changing the form of the holding company transaction drastically changes the taxation of
participating debenture holders. 343
A second benefit of using reverse triangular mergers in
holding company formation involves the impact of the original

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
351 in

Willens, supra note 210, at 52.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Willens, supra note 210, at 52.
[d.
[d. at 53.
[d.
[d. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-17-086 (Feb. 5, 1988) (illustrating the use of §
a holding company situation).
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issue discount rules. 344 By using reverse triangular mergers
instead of exchange offers, the corporation can avoid the economic and bookkeeping problems that accompany original
issue discounts. 345 Thus, a reverse triangular merger offers at
least two advantages when forming a holding company: taxfree exchange treatment for debenture holders, and avoidance
of original issue discount problems. 346 Additionally, shareholders are not disadvantaged by the use of a reverse triangular merger in holding company formation. 347

F. THE BAUSCH AND LOMB PROBLEM
In 1959, the Second Circuit decided Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner.348 In Bausch & Lomb, the Second
Circuit held that an acquisition did not qualify as a type C
reorganization when the parent previously owned 80 percent of
the target's stock as a result of a prior transaction. 349 In doing so, the court decided that the "solely for voting stock" requirement of the type C reorganization was not satisfied. 350
The court so held because a substantial portion of the assets
were not acquired for stock of the parent but rather in exchange for the target stock already owned by the parent. 351
The Bausch & Lomb issue should not be problematic in
the context of a forward triangular merger where there are no
substantial restrictions on the consideration which may be
used in the transaction. 352 However, preexisting ownership of
part of the target's stock will present a significant problem to
the parent in the reverse triangular merger context. 353 Before
the regulations of 1985, the issue was whether the stock of the

344. Willens, supra note 210, at 53 (referencing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-30-050 (May
3, 1988).
345. [d.
346. [d.
347. [d.
348. 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1935). See supra note
136 for a prior analysis of the Bausch & Lomb decision.
349. [d. at 78.
350. [d.
351. [d.
352. Cook and Coalson, Jr., supra note 172, at 335.
353. [d. at 336.
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target exchanged by the other target shareholders must itself
constitute control of target as defined in Section 368(c), or
whether the requirement would be satisfied so long as the sum
of that stock plus the stock previously owned by parent constituted contro1. 354 Unfortunately for taxpayers, the regulations
under Section 368(a)(2)(E) have adopted the former, more
restrictive view. 355
G. THE ABSENCE OF A "RELATIVE SIZE" LIMITATION IN
REORGANIZATIONS

An interesting relationship exists between reorganizations
and Section 351.356 Under Section 351, the transferor must be
in "control,,357 of the transferee corporation to receive nonrecognition treatment. 35S For example, if the owner of a "mom &
pop" grocery store which is operated as a sole proprietorship
transfers the business to a conglomerate in exchange for stock,
the transaction is undoubtedly taxable. 359 However, if the
grocery store is organized as a corporation, the transfer of the
stock or assets in exchange for the conglomerate's stock would
clearly qualify as a tax-free reorganization. 360 Thus, it appears that this operation of the reorganization provisions is
inconsistent with Section 351. 361
It may appear reasonable to find that the reorganization
provisions undermine the main purpose of Section 351 since
these provisions extend nonrecognition treatment to certain

354. [d. (analyzing the pre-19S5 proposed regulations).
355. [d.
356. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631.
357. I.R.C. Section 351 defines "control" in terms of § 36S(c), which defines
control as "the ownership of stock possessing at least SO percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least SO percent
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation."
35S. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631-632.
359. [d. at 632.
360. [d.
361. [d. If the sole proprietor were to incorporate her grocery store for the
purpose of immediately entering into a reorganization transaction, the Service
would take the position that the incorporation and subsequent merger transaction
should be subject to step-transaction doctrine and thus be treated as a taxable
sale. Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1, CB 73; West Coast Marketing Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 32 (1966).
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corporate acquisitions that otherwise would not be given such
treatment. 362 However, Section 351 may also be used to give
nonrecognition treatment to shareholders of a target corporation in a merger transaction that does not, under current law,
qualify as a reorganization. 363 Although strong arguments
have been advanced in favor of a relative size limitation,3M
the apparent lack of abuse in the absence of such a limitation

362. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 632-33. See supra notes 356-363 and
accompanying text for a brief discussion of the seeming disparity between Sections
351 and 368.
363. [d. Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., stated:
For example, the acquiring corporation and a minority shareholder of the target (e.g., a fIfteen-percent
shareholder) can form a new corporation with the
acqwnng corporation contributing cash and the
minority shareholder contributing target stock. The
acquiring corporation might receive all of the common stock of the new corporation and the minority
shareholder all of the preferred. The transaction
on its face qualilles under section 351 and the minority
shareholder
receives
nonrecognition
treatment. The new corporation then purchases for cash
the eighty-five percent balance of the stock of the
target. As a result, the acquiring corporation has
acquired all of the common equity in the target for
eighty-five percent cash and fIfteen percent stock,
the minority shareholder has received nonrecognition treatment, and the majority shareholders have
a taxable transaction. Further, the new corporation
could make a section 338 election and step up the
basis of the target's assets.
[d. at 633.
364. [d. at 631. The House version of the bill that became the 1954 LR.C.
contained a relative size limitation that would have extended tax-free treatment
only to mergers involving corporations of the same relative size. [d. at 630. This
provision did not become law, but the relative size rule that was contained in the
1954 bill would have denied reorganization treatment to any transaction where the
acquiror was more than four times larger than the target. [d. & n.138. Thus, this
restriction would make it practically impossible for an acquiring corporation that
had common stock which was worth more than fIve times the common stock of
the target to acquire the target in a tax-free exchange in which the consideration
paid was stock. [d. & n.138.
The idea of limiting nonrecognition treatment where stock is involved was
proposed in a more restrictive form by Jerome R. Hellerstein, who argued that
nonrecognition treatment should not be available in any reorganization transaction
where the target's shareholders receive "stock traded on an exchange or in the
over-the-counter market if an adequate market exists for the sale of the stock
received." Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARv. L. REv. 254, 284
(1957). See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 630-31 n.139.
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makes adopting one appear unwarranted. 365 Further, the reasoning employed by Professor Walter Blum against a relative
size limitation is persuasive:
[The absence of a relative size standard] must, I
submit, rest on a policy to encourage (or not
impede) particular types of corporate business
rearrangements. In this light it is easy to dispose of the point about the relative size of firms
participating in the union. Would anyone advocate that we adopt a broad policy of encouraging
the union of two equal size companies but not
two firms of radically different sizes?366

Of course, Professor Blum's argument fails to address the rationale of a relative size limitation, which is to award nonrecognition treatment to transactions that only involve a mere
change in investment form, and not substance. 367 There must
be an equivalent continuity of interese68 in the new investment form to warrant nonrecognition treatment. 369 If the effect of the merger is essentially a cashing out of the target
corporation's investment, then taxable sale treatment would be
more appropriate. 370 Perhaps a middle ground approach
would withhold any relative size limitations on reorganization
treatment, but impose a limitation on permissible boot paid in
a reorganization, determined by reference to the relative size of
the corporations. 371

365. See Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631.
366. Walter J. Blum, Corporate Acquisitions under the Income Tax: Another
Approach, 50 TAXES 85, 100 (1972).
367. See generally ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra note 12, at 37.
368. For example, equivalent "risk" and "control."
369. See CEB, supra note 2, at 92; see also ABRAMS AND DOERNBERG, supra
note 12, at 37.
370. Id.
371. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631.
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H. PERMISSIBLE BOOT LIMITATION

If reorganization status does not require relative size, the
amount of permissible booe72 consideration should be a function of the relative size of the target and the acquiring corporation. 373 The smaller the target relative to the acquirer, the
smaller the amount of permissible boot consideration. 374 Professor Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., proposed the following permissible boot standard:
Relative Size
To Acquirer
Less than
Less than
Less than
More than

of Target
1
1
1
1

to
to
to
to

20
10
5
5

Permissible
Boot
10%
20%
30%
40%

According to Professor Thompson, Jr., these amounts of permissible boot should be adequate to satisfy dissenters and
other shareholders who desire to be cashed out. 375
The rationale behind this boot standard is that in order to
receive the benefit of tax-free reorganization treatment, the
transaction should represent a continuation by the target's
shareholders of an equity interest in the combined venture. 376
Thus, the proportion of the consideration that consists of vot-

372. The term "boot" is not defined in the Code. Boot refers to cash or other
nonpermitted property that triggers recognition when received in an otherwise taxfree exchange. See BI'ITKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 11-53, 11-54. For example, boot may refer to consideration such as nonvoting stock, debt securities,
cash or other property. Id.
373. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 631.
374. Id. at 682.
375. Id. The Permissible Boot chart above was derived from Thompson, Jr.,
supra note 231. It is noteworthy that in 1958 the American Law Institute suggested that the maximum amount of boot be 33.3% of the consideration paid for the
target and that only fully participating stock qualify in determining whether the
suggested 66.66% continuity of interest test was satisfied. See AMERICAN LAW
INST., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, REPORT OF WORKING VIEWS, at 326 (1958);
see generally Kringel, Preventing a Dissenting Shareholder From Destroying a TaxFree Reorganization, 31 J. TAX'N 138 (1969). Also, Walter Blum has recommended
that the maximum amount of boot in a reorganization be 20%. See Blum, supra
note 366, at 89-90. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 642 n.180.
376. Thompson, Jr., supra note 231, at 639, 642.
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ing common stock should increase as the size of the target
becomes smaller in relation to the acquiring corporation. 377
Professor Thompson, Jr. reasonably maintained that this standard would not add unwarranted complexity to the reorganization definition and would be uniform among all forms of reorganization. 378
I. THE AVAILABILITY OF REVENUE RULING 67-448 AS
ALTERNATE THEORY FOR NONRECOGNITION TREATMENT

AN

If a tax-free spin-offl79 precedes an attempted reverse triangular merger, Section 368(a)(2)(E) may not apply because
the "substantially all" test would likely not be satisfied. 380 If,
however, the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 67_448381 survived
the enactment of Section 368(a)(2)(E), the reorganization could
qualify as a B reorganization. 382 Therefore, Revenue Ruling
67 -448 gives a corporation an alternate theory in favor of nonrecognition treatment. 383
In 1974, the Service published two Rulings involving
transactions which failed to qualify under Section 368(a)(2)(E)
because the subsidiary was not directly controlled by the parent corporation. 3M The Rulings held, however, that these
transactions did qualify as Section 368(a)(1)(B) reorganizations

377. 1d. at 641. The size of the target and the acquiror would be determined by
the relative fair market values of the outstanding voting common stock of both the
target and the acquiring corporations. 1d. The boot limitation could be determined
simply by referring to the percentage of the voting stock of the acquiring corporation that is held by the target's shareholders as a result of the reorganization. 1d.
378. 1d.
379. A "spin-off' involves the pro rata distribution by a corporation of stock of a
subsidiary to the corporation's shareholders. See Matthew M. McKenna and
Kirsten Schlenger, How to meet the five tests spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups must
pass to provide tax benefits, TAXATION FOR AcCOUNTANTS, 35 TAX'N ACCTS 298
(May 1985). Because the distributee shareholders do not surrender anything in exchange for the stock, spin-offs resemble § 301 distributions. 1d.
380. Willens, supra note 210, at 54.
381. Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144 (transitory subsidiary merges into target
in B reorganization).
382. 1d. See also Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 CB 83 (demonstrating that a spin-off
followed by a B reorganization is permissible, because there is no substantially all
requirement in a B reorganization).
383. Willens, supra note 210, at 54.
384. Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 CB 124; Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 CB 125.
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under the transitory merger theory of Revenue Ruling 67448. 385 This suggests that Revenue Ruling 67-448 has retained its vitality despite Section 368(a)(2)(E).386 Interestingly, the Service has applied the same theory to permit nonrecognition treatment through Section 351.387
Moreover, Regulation Section 1.368-2(j)(7), Examples (4)
and (5), indicate that B reorganization treatment can ''backstop" a failed Section 368(a)(2)(E).388 Thus, a failure to satisfy
the numerous details of a reverse triangular reorganization
does not necessarily preclude tax-free reorganization treatment. 389 Accordingly, in this situation, the relative flexibility
of the reverse triangular merger indicates that this transaction

385. See Beller, supra note 65, at 80. See also Rev. Rul. 74-564, 1974-2 CB 124;
Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 CB 125.
386. Willens, supra note 210, at 54.
387. Beller, supra note 65, at 80, reasoning that:
One point of difference between characterizing [a
reverse triangular merger] as a B reorganization or
Section 351 exchange, as opposed to an (a)(2)(E)
transaction, has to do with P's [parent's] basis in the
T [target's] stock. In a B or Section 351 exchange, P
takes a carryover basis in the T stock equal to the
exchanging T shareholders' basis plus any gain recognized to such shareholders on the exchange. By
contrast, in an (a)(2)(E), the Service now requires a
"net asset" basis - that is, P's basis in the T stock
is determined with reference to T's basis in its assets less its liabilities.
[d.
Given the right numbers, this difference in basis consequences may dictate
deliberately structuring [a reverse triangular merger] to flunk Section 368(a)(2)(E)
and qualify instead under Rev. Rul. 67-448. See generally Blanchard, Jr., The
Effect of the Step-Transaction Doctrine on Reverse Subsidiary Mergers: An Analysis,
55 J. TAX'N 72 (August 1981).
388. Willens, supra note 210, at 54. Treasury Regulation § 1.368-2(j)(7), Example (4), involves a creeping control situation, and Example (5) involves both a
creeping control and a prior redemption of target stock using target funds. See
Beller, supra note 65, at 80. In each, the 80% control requirement is not satisfied,
but the statement is made that "if S is a transitory corporation, formed solely for
purposes of effectuating the transaction, the transaction may qualify as a reorganization described in section 368(a)(I)(B) provided all of the applicable requirements
are satisfied." (The word "solely" is not used in Example (5». [d.
389. Beller, supra note 65, at 80.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/4

50

Ravazzini: Amalgamating Reorganizations

1996]

AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATIONS

591

will occupy a more prominent status among savvy tax practitioners. 39o

J.

TAXABLE FORWARD OR REVERSE TRIANGULAR MERGER?

The taxable391 reverse triangular merger is treated as a
sale and purchase of target stock by the acquiring corporation. 392 Unless a Section 338 election is made,393 a taxable
reverse triangular merger will result in only one level of tax
being levied on the target shareholders. 394 In contrast, the
Service treats taxable forward triangular mergers as a transfer
of assets from the target to the subsidiary, followed by the
liquidation of the target. 395 Before the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine in 1986,396 this characterization was of little
importance since a Section 337 election was available to avoid
a corporate level tax. 397 Mter the repeal, however, such
treatment resulted in the effective imposition of both a corporate level and a shareholder level tax upon the owners of the
target corporation. 39B Thus, although the requirements of a
forward triangular merger are easier to satisfy than those of a
reverse triangular merger, the stakes are much higher. 399
Members of the Corporate Tax Committee of the Los An390. Willens, supra note 210, at 54.
391. The term "taxable" is used to refer to triangular mergers which fail to
qualify for nonrecognition treatment under I.R.C. Section 368 and are therefore
subject to taxation.
392. See Los Angeles County Bar Association Section of Taxation, L.A Bar
Members Advocate Consistent Treatment For Taxable Mergers, TAX NOTES TODAY
(June 10, 1992) at 92 TNT 120·33 [hereinafter "LACBAST"].
393. Under I.R.C. § 338, which replaced § 334(b)(2), a qualified purchase of
target stock is now given independent economic significance from a subsequent
liquidation of the target regardless of whether a § 338 election is made or deemed
made. LACBAST, supra note 392.
394. See LAC BAST, supra note 392. As a stock purchase, the basis of the target assets will not be affected as a result of the merger, unless the acquiring
corporation makes a § 338 election. [d. This has been the rule since 1982 when
Congress repealed the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine as codified in § 334(b)(2) and
replaced it with § 338. [d.
395. [d.
396. See supra note 155 for a discussion of the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine.
397. LAC BAST, supra note 392.
398. [d.
399. [d.
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geles County Bar Association of Taxation4°O (hereinafter
"Committee") argue that characterization of a taxable forward
triangular merger as a sale of assets is "only a trap for the
unwary and could easily be avoided by more sophisticated taxpayers.,,401 The Committee maintains that the distinction between stock and asset acquisitions is "scarcely perceptible."402
The Committee proposes an elective system that puts the participants in control of the tax consequences of the merger,
irrespective of which of the participants survives. 403
The Committee further recommends a policy which encourages the availability of Section 368(a)(2)(D) reorganizations
and avoids the current "trap" caused by the choice of which
corporation is to survive the merger. 404 Such a policy would
treat a taxable merger as a taxable stock acquisition, followed
by a deemed Section 332 liquidation if the assets end up directly in the acquiring corporation. 405 This treatment of taxable mergers would result in a carryover basis of the target
assets in the possession of the surviving corporation. 406

400. [d.

401. [d. The Committee agrees with the commentator who reasoned:
"Factually, the line between stock and asset acquisitions is scarcely perceptible... If this distinction
has become so blurred as to be scarcely perceptible," it is appropriate to ask whether an elective
system that puts the participants in control of the
tax consequences of the merger, irrespective of
which of the participants survives, might be appropriate.
[d. (quoting G. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal For Mandatory
Uniform Rules, 44 TAX LAw REv. 145 (1989».
402. LACBAST, supra note 392.
403. [d.
404. [d.
405. [d. In some situations, it may be preferable to make an election available
to elect asset sale treatment. [d. This will result in a corporate level tax and a
step-up in basis of the assets transferred to the corporation surviving the merger.
[d.
406. [d.
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K. NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON BASIS ADJUSTMENT
FOLLOWING A TRIANGULAR REORGANIZATION (APPLICABLE
TO ALL TRIANGULAR REORGANIZATIONS ON OR AFI'ER DEC.

23, 1994)407

Congress has failed to provide explicit statutory rules
concerning the adjustments, if any, to be made to a parent's
basis in its subsidiary or target stock following a triangular
reorganization. 40B Further, Congress has not expressly provided that a subsidiary does not recognize gain on its exchange of
parent stock for target assets or stock in a triangular reorganization. 409 However, in December 1994 the Service did issue
new proposed regulations which employ an "over-the-top model,,410 for determining a parent corporation's basis adjustment
in a subsidiary stock as a result of a triangular reorganization.41l
An over-the-top model would produce a result that treats

the transaction as if the parent had acquired the target's assets or stock directly and then transferred the assets or stock
to the subsidiary.412 The Service maintains that this model is
appropriate for triangular reorganizations. 413 First, the code
expressly defines the basis results in a parent-drop reorganiza-

407. See Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury, Internal Revenue Service
Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Public Hearing (CO-993-71J, Controlling Corporation's Basis Adjustment in Its
Controlled Corporation's Stock Following a Triangular Reorganization, Issued Dec.
22, 1994, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (Dec. 23, 1994), 59 FR 66280 (Dec. 1994)
[hereinafter "Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury"].
408. Id.
409. Id. These issues do not arise in a parent/drop reorganization because § 358
applies to detennine parent's basis in subsidiary stock on parent's transfer of
target's assets or stock to subsidiary, and § 1032 applies to parent's exchange of
its own stock for target assets or stock. Id.
410. Under that model, following a tax-free triangular reorganization, a controlling corporation would detennine its basis in the stock of its target or its acquisition subsidiary as if it had acquired that stock itself and then contributed it to its
subsidiary. Id.
411. See BNA Mgrnt. Briefing, Corporate Taxes - ABA Tax Section at March
31 Hearing to Endorse Triangular Merger Proposal, (Mar. 30, 1995). The December
1994 proposed Treasury Regulations replace a 1981 proposed rule on the same
subject. Id.
412. Id.
413. rd.
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tion.414 Tax policy is furthered, therefore, because cognate reorganizations are treated similarly.415 Second, subsidiary
stock owned by a parent can be perceived as a "surrogate" for
the target assets or stock acquired by subsidiary in the reorganization.416 Therefore a parent achieves neutrality between
the sale of subsidiary stock and the sale by subsidiary of the
assets or stock acquired in the reorganization. m
Newly proposed Section 1.358-6(d) requires the basis in
the parent's subsidiary or target stock be reduced by the fair
market value of consideration not provided by the parent. 418
Additionally, the newly proposed regulations permit a net
negative adjustment to the parent's historic basis in subsidiary
only in consolidated group situations.419 In the consolidated
context, the adjustment may mean that the parent experiences
an excess loss account under Section 1.1502-19 in its subsidiary or target stock.420 In the nonconsolidated context, the
proposed regulations preclude a net negative adjustment and
do not cause a reduction to the parent's historic basis even if
that reduction would not result in a negative basis. 421 Thus,
the new proposed regulations do not deter the use of an existing subsidiary in the reorganization because none of the
parent's historic basis in its subsidiary stock is reduced. 422
New proposed Section 1.358-6(c)(2)(i) speaks to reverse
triangular mergers, maintaining the general rule that a
parent's basis in its target stock is adjusted as if the target's
assets were acquired. However, if a parent receives less than
all of the target's stock, the parent's basis in the target stock
received is determined only with respect to an allocable portion

414. See Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury, supra note 407.
415. [d.
416. [d. The Service asserts that I.R.C. § 362(b) principles should govern the
acljustment to parent's basis in its subsidiary stock. [d.
417. [d.
418. [d. This includes any parent stock not provided by parent pursuant to the
plan of reorganization. [d.
419. [d.
420. [d. See new Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-30, 59 FR 66280 (Dec. 1994).
421. See Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), Treasury, supra note 407.
422. [d.
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of the basis determined under new proposed Section 1.3686(c)(2)(i).423
Additionally, new proposed Section 1.358-6(c)(2)(iii) includes a special rule for situations when the transaction qualifies as both a reverse triangular merger and a stock acquisition under Section 368(a)(I)(B).424 This rule permits a parent
to adjust its basis in its target stock based either on the
target's asset basis or on the aggregate basis of the target
stock surrendered in the transaction. 425 To date, the general
consensus among tax practitioners appears to be that the Service is correct to follow the over-the-top mode1. 426
At an Internal Revenue Service hearing on March 31,
1995, tax attorney Mark Yecies427 asserted that the new proposal improves the 1981 proposal because it relies on a general, rather than a mechanical approach to the taxation of triangular mergers. 428 However, Mr. Yecies noted that a stock basis approach may be more appropriate than an over-the-top
model for reverse triangular mergers. 429 As for the newly proposed regulations permitting taxpayers to choose between basis
treatment if the transaction qualifies as both an (2)(E) and a
(1)(B), Mr. Yecies asserted that the Service should consider
this approach even in cases which qualify only under
(1)(B).430
Also presenting testimony at the March 31st hearing was
tax attorney Reeves Westbrook,431 who opposed the regulations.432 Mr. Westbrook argued that no statutory authority
423. ld.
424. ld.
425. ld.
426. See BNA Mgmt. Briefing, supra note 411.
427. Mark Yecies is a tax attorney at Ernst & Young, Washington, who presented testimony to the I.R.S. advocating the implementation of the new proposed
Treasury Regulations. ld.
428. ld.
429. See BNA Mgmt. Briefing, supra note 411. The stock basis approach is described in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). ld.
430. ld.
431. Reeves Westbrook is a tax attorney at Covington & Burling, Washington,
who presented testimony to the I.R.S. against the implementation of the new proposed Treasury Regulations. ld.
432. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

55

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 4

596

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:541

exists for determining basis in a forward triangular merger by
constructing a hypothetical transitory step in which the assets
of a target are deemed to be transferred to the parent. 433 Mr.
Westbrook maintained that "[t]his step is contrary both to the
form and substance of a forward triangular reorganization ...
is contrary to the history of the triangular reorganization provisions, and is internally inconsistent with portions of the
proposed regulations.,,434 Mr. Westbrook proposed that the
Service should allow additional flexibility in determining a
parent's basis in the stock of its subsidiary for periods beginning before the effective date of the final regulations. 435
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the current amalgamating reorganization rules and
definitions, there remains an asymmetry in treatment of triangular mergers. This disparate treatment is based primarily
upon the distinction of whether the reorganization takes the
form of a forward or reverse triangular merger. No justification
exists for the unequal treatment of these economically cognate
transactions.
Since the issuance of the 1985 regulations, tax planning
for reverse triangular mergers has certainly been more predictable. However, there remains a need for further clarification
and unification of the Code. The legislative history of Section
368(a)(2)(E) suggests that the section's primary purpose was to
eliminate the tax-incongruity of forward and reverse triangular
reorganizations. Indeed, a 1970 Congressional report argued
there is "no reason why a merger in one direction should be
taxable when the merger in the other direction, under identical
circumstances, is tax-free.,,436
Despite Congressional intent, the Service has been anything but zealous to reconcile Sections 368(a)(2)(D) and (2)(E).
In particular, the Service's current contentment with the anticreeping control rule in (2)(E) is unwarranted. The fact that a
433. See BNA Mgmt. Briefing, supra note 411.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. S. REP'T No. 91-1553, 91ST CONG., 20 SESS. AT 2 (1970).
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parent corporation already owns more than 20% of a target's
stock will not alone preclude nonrecognition treatment in forward triangulars. There appears to be no sound policy reason
why the same circumstances should bar such treatment in
reverse triangular mergers. While the Service has made some
positive changes regarding asset push-ups and drop-downs, tax
planners should still remain cautious. It can only be hoped
that, in time, the reorganization provisions will attain a state
of tax equipoise.
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